VPNAVY VP-5 Mercury Capsule Recovery
http://www.vpnavy.org
VPNAVY Address

HistoryVP-11 HistoryHistory

Circa 1945

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: History ThumbnailCameraVP-11 History "...Looking Back To 1945 - Civilian families gather to learn about the Consolidated PBY-5 at NAS Jacksonville Air Show. This "flying boat" patrol bomber was produced in 1936 to 1945 and was not retired from the U. S. Navy until 1957. As the iconic aircraft of today's maritime patrol and reconnaissance community, the Catalina could be equipped with depth charges, bombs, torpedos and .50 caliber machine guns - Thursday April 15, 2010..." WebSite: JaxNews http://www.jaxairnews.com/ [17APR2010]

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...01MAY45 - PBMs (VPB-11 and FAW-1) sink Japanese cargo vessel Kyugkoku Maru off Mokpo, Korea, 34°35'N, 126°00'E; USN land-based planes on anti-shipping sweeps over Yellow Sea also sink merchant cargo ships Miyatama Maru and Komadori Maru off Mokpo, 34°11'N, 126°35'E. Land-based USN aircraft are also most likely responsible for damage inflicted on merchant vessel Taruyasu Maru in the Chochiku Channel the same day..." HyperWar http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1945.html [11SEP2005]

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: Naval Aviation News Magazine "...28 Units Receive Commendation - Naval Aviation News - October 1945.." WebSite: http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1945/15oct45.pdf [10NOV2004]

VP History ThumbnailCamera

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: Naval Aviation News Magazine "...Three Squadrons Are Cited - Naval Aviation News - January 1945.." WebSite: http://www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1945/15jan45.pdf [10NOV2004]

VP History ThumbnailCamera

Circa 1944

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...War Diary Patrol Bombing Squadron - 01SEP1944-31OCT1944..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [07OCT2013]

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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...History of FAW-14 - History from 15OCT42-01DEC42 - Submitted December 22nd, 1944. Squadron's Assigned: VP-1, VP-2, VP-4, VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14, VP-15, VP-21, VP-23, VP-24, VP-33, VP-44, VP-53, VP-54, VP-71, VP-72, VP-81, VP-91, VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-106, VP-109, VP-111, VP-115, VP-117, VP-118, VP-119, VP-121, VP-122 and VP-202..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [06DEC2012]

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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: History ThumbnailCameraFAW-2 VP Aircraft and Location "...FAW-2, VPB-4, VPB-11, VPB-13, VPB-16, VPB-26, VPB-27, VPB-28, VPB-34, VPB-52, VPB-100 and VPB-106 - FAW-2/A12-1-013 December to 31 December 1944..." Official U. S. Navy Records (National Archives and Records Administration) via Fold3 http://www.fold3.com/ [15OCT2012]

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 11 Jan 1944..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [29SEP2006]

VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

VD-1, VD-2, VD-3 and VD-4

VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-7, VJ-8, VJ-9, VJ-10, VJ-11, VJ-12, VJ-13, VJ-14, VJ-15, and VJ-16

VP-6 Coast Guard

VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14, VP-15, VP-16, VP-17, VP-18 and VP-19

VP-20, VP-23 and VP-24

VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45

VP-52 and VP-54

VP-61 and VP-62

VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

VP-81 and VP-84

VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94

VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109

VP-110, VP-111, VP-112, VP-113, VP-115, VP-116 and VP-117

VP-126, VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129

VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139

VP-140, VP-141, VP-142, VP-143, VP-144, VP-145, VP-146, VP-147, VP-148 and VP-149

VP-150 and VP-151

VP-201, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-208 and VP-209

VP-210, VP-211, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214, VP-215 and VP-216


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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...LCDR Thomas S. White took over as the Commanding Officer of VP-11 on 24 May 1944...." WebSite: Peter Dunn's AUSTRALIA @ WAR http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/usnavy/vpb-11.htm [07OCT2005]

On 10 February 1944, VP-11 left Palm Island Naval Air Station for Perth in Western Australia, where they carried out convoy patrols. They were again reassigned to Fleet Air Wing 10 (FAW-10) while they were in Perth. LCDR Thomas S. White took over as the Commanding Officer of VP-11 on 24 May 1944.

On 19 July 1944, VP-11 relocated to New Guinea and Schouten Islands and was reassigned again to FAW-17. A detachment of three PBY-5's was sent to Woendi Lagoon on Biak.

VP-11 was relocated to Middleburg Island on 23 August 1944 and continued its Black Cat operations.

Patrol Squadron 11 (VP-11) was redesignated to Patrol Bombing Squadron 11 (VPB-11) on 1 October 1944.

On 6 October 1944, VPB-11 was based at Morotai. It was Morotai that it was reunited with tender vessel San Pablo (AVP 30). On 12 October 1944 tender vessel Orca (AVP 49) arrived to provide more accommodation for the personnel of VPB-11.

On 14 November 1944, VPB-11 relocated to Woendi with fifteen PBY-5's. VPB-11 relocated to Morotai on 5 December 1944, and returned to Woendi on 15 December 1944. Here they boarded USS Pocomoke (AV-9) and were transported back to the U.S.

VPB-11 was officially withdrawn from combat service on 19 December 1944, and fifteen PBY-5's and their crews left Woendi and flew to NAS San Diego in California. VPB-11 was disbanded at NAS North Island, San Diego, California on 20 June 1945.

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "27JUL44--Rear Admiral Fran D. Wagner, Commander, Aircraft 7th Fleet, broke his flag in Wrighton 27 July and used the tender as his temporary flagship. That same day, VP-11 arrived at Mios Woendi and operated from Wright.." http://namopdc.nawcad.navy.mil/talps/tapxo.htm


Circa 1943

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Circa 1943 - "Pistol Packin Mama" - pictures from Dad's (KENYON, Howard R.) collection. Dad is front center in lower left picture (left picture below)..." Contributed by Howard Kenyon, Jr. howeird1@hotmail.com [29JUN2014]

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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: VP-11 PictureVPB-11 History "...Circa 1943 - "Pistol Packin Mama"..." Contributed by John Lucas JohnLucas@netzero.com [19FEB2005]

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 31 May 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [02OCT2006]

VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

CASU

PATSU

VD-1, VD-2 and VD-3

VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-7 and VJ-10

VP-1

VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14 and VP-15

VP-23

VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45

VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54

VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63

VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

VP-81 and VP-84

VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94

VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109

VP-125, VP-126, VP-127 and VP-128

VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139

VP-140, VP-142, VP-144 and VP-146

VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209

VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212

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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 16 Jan 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [01OCT2006]

VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

CASU and PATSU

VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-6, VJ-7 and VJ-8

VP-6 Coast Guard

VP-3

VP-11 and VP-12

VP-23 and VP-24

VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44

VP-51, VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54

VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63

VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

VP-81, VP-82, VP-83 and VP-84

VP-91, VP-92VP-93, and VP-94

VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109

VP-110

VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129

VP-131, VP-132, VP-133 and VP-134

VP-200, VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209

VP-210, VP-211, VP-210, and VP-216


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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 09 Nov 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [01OCT2006]

VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

CASU and PATSU

VD-1, VD-2, VD-3 and VD-4

VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-4, VJ-5, VJ-15, and VJ-16

VP-6 Coast Guard

VP-1

VP-11, VP-12, VP-13, VP-14, VP-15 and VP-16

VP-23 and VP-24

VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

VP-43, VP-44 and VP-45

VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54

VP-61, VP-62 and VP-63

VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

VP-81 and VP-84

VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94

VP-101, VP-102, VP-103, VP-104, VP-105, VP-106, VP-107, VP-108 and VP-109

VP-110, VP-111, VP-112, VP-113, VP-114, VP-115 and VP-116

VP-125, VP-126, VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129

VP-130, VP-131, VP-132, VP-133, VP-134, VP-135, VP-136, VP-137, VP-138 and VP-139

VP-140, VP-141, VP-142, VP-143, VP-144, VP-145, VP-146, VP-147, VP-148 and VP-149

VP-150

VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209

VP-210, VP-211, VP-212, VP-213, VP-214, VP-215 and VP-216


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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft - Dated 09 Feb 1943..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [28SEP2006]

VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

VJ-1, VJ-2, VJ-3, VJ-7 and VJ-8

VP-11, VP-12, VP-13 and VP-14

VP-23 and VP-24

VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44

VP-61, VP-62, and VP-63

VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

VP-81, VP-82, VP-83 and VP-84

VP-91, VP-92, VP-93 and VP-94

VP-101

VP-127, VP-128 and VP-129

VP-130, VP-132, VP-133 and VP-134

VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208 and VP-209,

VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212
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HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Squadron 11 (VP-11) completed their combat training at MCAS/NAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and departed in their PBY-5 Catalinas for Perth in Western Australia on 22 May 1943. Their Commanding Officer was LCDR Clifford M. Campbell...." WebSite: Peter Dunn's AUSTRALIA @ WAR http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/usnavy/vpb-11.htm [07OCT2005]

They arrived in Perth on 8 June 1943 and were assigned to Fleet Air Wing 10 (FAW-10). While their ground crew and equipment travelled by ship to Australia, they commenced search and reconnaissance patrols.

VP-11 left Perth on 9 September 1943 and travelled to New Guinea via Brisbane and Palm Island Naval Air Station to relieve Patrol Squadron 101 (VP-101).

VP-11 was now assigned to Fleet Air Wing 17 (FAW-17). From the 1 October 1943 until 19 November 1943, VP-11 was based aboard San Pablo (AVP 30) in Jenkins Bay. VP-11 carried out night searches for enemy ships and carried out bombing attacks on Japanese submarines on Garove Island. Support vessel Half Moon (AVP 26) relieved San Pablo on 9 October 1943.

On 19 November 1943, VP-11 relocated to Port Moresby to relieve VP-101. VP-52 took over their operations out of Jenkins Bay. While at Port Moresby, VP-11 started Black Cat operations on 23 November 1943 and worked together with Bomber Groups of 5th Bomber Command to carry out daylight bombing attacks.

VP-11 left Port Moresby on 28 December 1943 and moved to Palm Island Naval Air Station where they were taken off combat duties. The Squadron comprised 13 PBY-5 Catalinas, 46 officers and 99 enlisted men. They carried out training and routine administrative and passenger flights between Port Moresby, Samari and Brisbane.

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: VP-11 PictureVPB-11 Squadron "...Southwest Pacific - 1943-1944 - Presidential Unit Citations (2) - 'Can Do Eleven'..." [29AUG2004]

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Down at sea by Thomas L. Hine, USN (retired). (Word War II Times February-March 1988 Volume 3 Number 2 Page 3)..." Contributed by WINTER, George B. pbycat@bellsouth.net WEBSITE: http://www.vpnavy.org/winter.html [03JUN2002]

DOWN AT SEA
By Thomas L. Hine, USN (Retired)

VP-11 Newsletter ThumbnailCameraTom Hine (Pilot) and Joe Higgs (Co-Pilot)Tom Hine, Pilot, and Joe Higgs, Co-Pilot had "Pistol Packin' Mama" as a witness to their aerial ability with their PBY

On the south shore of New Britain, about half way between Rabual to the east and Sag Sag to the west, lies the little village of Gasnata.

My crew and I were members of VP-11, a Black Cat squadron based at China Strait near Samurai, on the extreme south eastern tip of New Guinea. We flew 12 to 14 hour patrols every third night, and for the past month our crew had been bombing Gasmata with daisy cutters and incendiaries.

On the night of October 11, 1943, we were flying PBY -5 Bureau Number 08328 on Sector Mike patrol. We were armed with two 325 pound and two 650 pound depth charges, all of them with alternate arming of either 25 foot hydrostatic or instantaneous (0.05 second) fuses.

The members of our crew were myself, plane commander, Lt.(jg), Herman R. Hougland (now deceased), co-pilot, Ens. Joseph Higgs, navigator, Dennis Garchow, plane captain, Jake Stice, and Leonard Kuykendall, gunners, Howard Kenyon, bombardier, Paul D. Bishop and Willard D. Morgan, radiomen.

About one mile south of Gasmata we sighted an "I" class Japanese sub- marine heading east. It was probably returning from a supply mission to Lae, New Guinea, which our forces had nearly isolated.

It was about 9:30 PM, with a broken overcast, when we made our glide bombing attack with a release at about 150 feet. We dropped one 325 pound and one 650 pound depth charge in ripple, but one of them must have armed for instantaneous detonation.

What a kick in the rear. Hoagland and I could barely control the air- craft, which felt as if it were mortally wounded. We reduced power and landed in the ocean.

After landing I undid my seat belt, stepped onto the cat walk, and immediately found myself waist deep in

It was about 9:30 PM, with a broken overcast, when we made our glide bombing attack with a release at about 150 feet. We dropped one 325 pound and one 650 pound depth charge in ripple, but one of them must have armed for instantaneous detonation.

What a kick in the rear. Hoagland and I could barely control the air- craft, which felt as if it were mortally wounded. We reduced power and landed in the ocean.

After landing I undid my seat belt, stepped onto the cat walk, and immediately found myself waist deep in water. The port horizontal stabilizer was hanging down vertically and there were foot wide holes in the hull. Our crew of nine got out two, seven- man rafts, water tanks, emergency rations, clock, charts, tarpaulins, and parachutes. The aircraft sank after ~ about 10 minutes. I

We tied the rafts together and I took a vote among the gang as to whether we should go ashore near Gasmata, or head south toward friendly territory, the Trobriand Islands, which were about 160 nautical miles away. Not surprisingly it was unanimous that we head south.

The only injury was to Paul Bishop, who' had a two inch piece bomb casing in his thigh. It was so hot that he burned his fingers when he pulled it out. I put sulfa diazine on it, but it was already cauterized and never did bother him much.

I am susceptible to sunburn, so I used the pilot chute from a parachute as a sun bonnet and it worked fine. We caught a few fish, but we had plenty of emergency rations. We never did see any sharks, but we kept a gun handy whenever we went overboard to cool off.

Two men paddled and one steered in each raft, and we navigated by the stars and a compass. Our position was on the direct route from Port Moresby, New Guinea, to Rabaul, which the Fifth Air Force was bombing heavily at that stage.

Whenever B'-24's appeared we would signal with our mirrors, smoke, and the yellow tarpaulins, but they were too high to see us. We used the blue side of the tarps whenever we saw unknown or enemy aircraft.

Whenever the wind blew from the north we would rig a sail and really scoot. When it was against us we rigged sea anchors: The tarps were also useful for gathering water in rainstorms, and we had 14 gallons I when we were picked up.

Even though we had plenty of water and food, there's not much to do on a tiny piece of rubber in the middle of a wide ocean. There were continuous E big swells, and the steady beat of the hot sun was broken only by occasional showers that made conditions humid as well as hot. Refilling the water c tanks with rainwater and paddling in a straight line gave us something to do, but with nothing to look at but sky and sea, it wasn't exactly a party!

We made about 100 nautical miles in three days, which isn't speedy, but would have gotten us to friendly territory in another two days. We were finally sighted by an Army Air Corps Dumbo PBY -5A, which landed and picked us all up. We machine gunned the rafts to sink them.

They dropped us off at Trobriand Island, where we were put in the hospital for observation and sent on our way the next day. We hitchhiked by LST back to our base at Samurai. Even though no one had even been looking for us, the Navy was glad enough to have us back and gave us all 30 days R & R on Palm Island, in Australia.

Not the most luxurious way to cruise the South Pacific, but surely one none of us will ever forget!

HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Squadron Awards..." Contributed by Mahlon K. Miller mkwsmiller@cox.net [23APR2001]

  • Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
    24 Oct 62 - 31 Dec 62
    10 May 65 - 10 Aug 65

  • Navy Expeditionary Service Medal
    05 Aug 90 - 21 Feb 91

  • Armed Forces Service Medal
    01 Apr 96 - 31 May 96

  • Joint Meritorious Unit Award
    19 Jun 91 - 14 Aug 91
    09 Jan 92 - 30 Apr 92

  • Meritorious Unit Commendation
    05 Sep 69 - 30 Jun 70
    01 Jun 75 - 16 Jul 75
    27 Jan 82 - 27 Jul 82
    11 May 83 - 05 Oct 83
    10 Jun 90 - 10 Dec 90
    01 May 93 - 17 Sep 93
    17 Jun 94 - 17 Dec 94
    12 Jan 96 - 01 Jun 96

  • Navy "E" Ribbon (Battle "E")
    01 Oct 79 - 30 Sep 80

  • Navy Unit Commendation
    12 Oct 67 - 15 Feb 68
    15 May 80 - 05 Nov 80

  • Presidential Unit Citation
    15 Sep 43 - 01 Feb 44

  • Southwest Asia Service Medal
    10 Nov 90 - 09 Dec 90

    VP-11 Participating Aircrew
  • Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
    01 May 93 - 30 Sep 93

    Circa 1942

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: History ThumbnailCameraVP-11 History "...I appreciate the accomplishments of VPB Navy Squadrons during WW2 in the South Pacific, one Dumbo mission by VP-11 at the end of October 1942 is quite interersting. I am fond of WW2 History in the South Pacific as I live in Noumea, New Caledonia, where the squadron was based at Ile Nou in 1942 - 1943. I join a file essentially from the VP-11 Pegasus Website (http://www.vp-11.org/) were this rescue is quoted, and a page for 30 Oct, 1942 of the logbook of Walter Howard where this information is quite explicit, but without any more explanation or details on the place: I would be very glad to have details and photos about this C47 (and after also PBY) accident and the following search and rescue or contacts where to get such information. I seached on books and on the Web extensively but I never got information on this rescue. Best Regards - Jean-Paul Mugnier ulysse@lagoon.nc - 6, rue de Bourgogne, Vallee des colons, Noumea, New-Caledonia. I am now retired from French Civil Aviation, and I am a pilot and a diver, member of Fortunes de mer Caledoniennes Association, dealing with wercks all around New-Caledonia for the Maritime Museum of NC, of which I was the former President for 13 years. I am a new member of Fold3 archives website quite rich in historic data..." Contributed by Jean-Paul Mugnier ulysse@lagoon.nc [07JAN2013]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (VP-11) - U. S. Action with Enemy on September 7-8, 1942..." Official U. S. Navy Documention [19JAN2013]

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    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Full Text Citations For Award of The Navy Cross - To U.S. Navy Personnel - World War II - (2,889 Awards) - Navy Cross Citations U.S. Navy - World War II..." WebSite: Home of Heros http://www.homeofheroes.com/ valor/ 1_Citations/ 03_wwii-nc/ nc_06wwii_navyC.html [20NOV2007]

    CLARK, CARLTON HOWARD

    Synopsis:

    The Navy Cross is presented to Carlton Howard Clark, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, for extraordinary heroism in action from September 5 to 11, 1942, while serving as a pilot with Patrol Squadron 11 (VP-11) in the Solomon Islands. His outstanding courage and determined skill were at all times inspiring and in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

    Born: June 17, 1914 at Corbin, Kentucky
    Home Town: Corbin, Kentucky

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Op-40-A-KB - (SC)A6-4/VZ - January 6, 1942 - Location of U. S. Naval Aircraft..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/ [23SEP2006]

    VP SQUADRONS MENTIONED

    VP-11, VP-12 and VP-14

    VP-23 and VP-24

    VP-31, VP-32, VP-33 and VP-34

    VP-41, VP-42, VP-43 and VP-44

    VP-51, VP-52, VP-53 and VP-54

    VP-61, VP-62, VP-63

    VP-71, VP-72, VP-73 and VP-74

    VP-81 and VP-83

    VP-91, VP-92 and VP-94

    VP-101

    VP-201, VP-202, VP-203, VP-204, VP-205, VP-206, VP-207, VP-208, VP-209, VP-210, VP-211 and VP-212


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    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...San Pablo - A shallow, northern extension of San Francisco Bay in California. (AVP-30: dp. 2,619; l. 310'9"; b. 41'2"; dr. 12'7"; s. 18.5 k.; cpl. 367; a. 2 5", 8 40mm., 8 20mm.; cl. Barnegat) (Squadrons Mentioned: VP-11, VPB-25, VP-33, VP-34, VP-52, VP-101..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/s4/san_pablo.htm [25DEC2005]

    San Pablo (AVP-30) was laid down on 2 July 1941 302 by the Associated Shipbuilding Co., Seattle, Wash.; launched on 31 March 1942; sponsored by Mrs. W. A. Hall; and commissioned on 15 March 1943, Comdr. R. R. Darron in command.

    Following commissioning and outfitting, San Pablo conducted shakedown in the Puget Sound area and then steamed to San Diego for readiness training. On 15 June, the small seaplane tender departed the west coast and headed for the South Pacific. At Espiritu Santo, San Pablo embarked marines and deck cargo; then proceeded to Noumea, New Caledonia. After offloading there, she went to Naval Seaplane Base Brisbane, Australia, to pick up the flight crews and aviation supplies, including spare parts and fuel, of patrol squadron VP-101; then returned to Noumea to commence operations as tender and base for "Black-Cat" (night-fighting, air-search, and reconnaissance) PBM's and PBY's.

    With VP-101 and assigned crash boats, San Pablo formed Task Group 73.1 and established their seaplane base by charting the bay, setting out mooring and marker bouys, and constructing quarters for squadron personnel at nearby Honey Hollow. They also built an advanced base at Samarai, Papua, New Guinea. For the next several months, the "Black Cats" operated from these bases, preying on enemy shipping along the coasts of New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, and in the Bismarck Sea. They inflicted great losses on inter-island barge traffic as well as to heavy shipping; harassed enemy troops with night bombing and strafing missions; conducted photo intelligence operations; provided at-sea search and rescue support for downed Army fliers and sailors of sunken vessels; and carried high ranking officers, friendly coast watchers, and native guerrilla units.

    While continuously on the alert for enemy air attack, San Pablo sailors worked around the clock to fuel, repair, arm, and control the seaplanes; and to feed and care for their crews. On 9 October, she was relieved by Half Moon (AVP-26) and sailed to Brisbane for long needed repair, replenishment, and shore leave. She returned to Noumea on 20 December and resumed operations with VP-52. During January 1944, she gave direct support to the force which occupied Finschhafen, New Guinea, and helped to establish a new advance base at Langemak Bay. At times, she also tended the planes of VP-34, then flying rescue missions for the 5th AAF from Port Moresby. She once temporarily based two OS2U scout planes from Boise (CL-47).

    From Langemak Bay, San Pablo's planes helped to prevent the Japanese from supplying garrisons on Rabaul and Kavieng. On 25 February, relieved again by Half Moon, San Pablo returned to Noumea for repairs alongside Dobbin (AD-3). During the work, she assisted in removing a screw from Aaron Ward (DM-34) using her seaplane winch. This speeded repairs to the destroyer-minelayer and allowed her to reach Ulithi in time to prepare for the forthcoming Okinawa campaign.

    By 24 March, San Pablo was conducting operations at Seeadler Harbor, Admiralty Islands, with VP-33 and VP-52 planes. They carried out night bombing missions in the Carolines and search flights by day. The pace had so quickened by the end of March that USS Tangier (AV-8) was brought in to help carry the load. On 13 May, they moved to Hollandia to patrol the approaches to Wakde Island prior to Allied landings there. Relieved by Orca (AVP-49) on 26 May, San Pablo then refueled PT boats at Humboldt Bay and transported personnel and cargo between Manus, Seeadler, Emirau, and Wpendi. On 19 August, she commenced ASW patrols with VP-11 planes at Woendi and, during October and November, conducted ASW operations off Morotai and Hollandia. Later relieved by Saw Carlos (AVP-51), she moved to Anibong on Bay, Leyte, to support planes conducting search missions in the Philippines.

    On 8 December, San Pablo received survivors of Mahan (DD-364) who had been picked up by one of her PBM's after that destroyer had suffered three kamikaze hits and sank in Ormoc Bay. She then joined a convoy en route to Mindoro and came under severe attack by suicide planes for ten consecutive days. Most of the kamikazes were beaten off by AA fire from the convoy screen or by CAP planes. However, one hit an ammunition ship which completely disintegrated in a tremendous explosion, and another crashed into a Liberty ship and caused severe damage. On 30 December at Mindoro, a Val barely passed astern of San Pablo and crashed into Orestes (AGP-10), wounding four San Pablo men with shrapnel. On the 31st, a Betty bombed nearby Porcupine (IX-126) and then crashed into Gansevoort (DD-608). Through January and early February 1945, San Pablo made search missions in the South China Sea and along the China coast with VPB-25 and VP-33 squadrons. On 13 February, she was relieved by USS Tangier (AV-8) and returned to Leyte.

    Through April, she escorted LST-777, Chestatee (AOG-49), and various merchant transports between Leyte and Palawan. She then steamed, via Morotai, to Manus. At the end of June, she moved to Samar and the Lingayen Gulf area for air search and rescue operations in the South China Sea-Formosa area. These lasted until 15 August when she received orders to cease offensive operations. On 2 September, the day of Japan's formal surrender ceremony, San Pablo was in Lingayen Gulf providing ASW patrols to cover occupation convoys bound for Japan.

    San Pablo returned to Bremerton, Wash., on 17 November to prepare for inactivation. She moved to Alameda, Calif., on 25 March 1946 and remained idle until placed out of commission, in reserve, on 13 January 1947.

    Following conversion to a hydrographic-survey vessel, San Pablo was reconunissioned on 17 September 1948 at San Francisco, Comdr. T. E. Chambers in command. She conducted shakedown training off San Diego from 29 October to 15 November and was then ordered to report to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. San Pablo reached Portsmouth, Va., on 14 December and completed outfitting prior to sailing on 3 February 1949, in company with Rehoboth (AVP-50) for oceanographic work in the western approaches to the Mediterrannean. Calling at Ponta Delgada, Azores; Plymouth, England; Gibraltar; and Bermuda; she returned to Philadelphia on 18 April. During the remainder of the year, she conducted two similar cruises to survey and measure ocean currents; and, during the last, made a study of the North Atlantic Drift. She included in her ports of call Scapa Flow; the Orkney Islands; Oslo, Norway; and Copenhagen, Denmark. San Pablo was redesignated AGS-30, effective 25 August 1949.

    Beginning 18 January 1950, she conducted a survey of the Gulf Stream; and, from 5 to 26 June, served as Survey Headquarters Ship for a group of American and Canadian vessels engaged in broad coverage behavioral studies of that massive current. After a cruise to Casablanca, French Morocco, in July and August, she returned to the east coast of the United States to conduct survey operations between New London and Key West for the remainder of the year.

    During 1951, San Pablo conducted oceanographic studies during various cruises, ranging from Scotland to the Mediterranean and along the coast in the Narragansett Bay operating area. Her tasks included making accurate profile studies of the ocean bottom for the purpose of evaluating new sonar devices. In 1952, she spent the majority of her time in the North Atlantic, and devoted the latter part of the year to training operations out of Norfolk. From 1953 through 1968, San Pablo alternated between the North Atlantic and the Caribbean conducting studies on salinity, sound reflectivity, underwater photography techniques, deep bottom core sampling, bottom profile mapping, subsurface wave phenomena, and other topics still classified. For several months during 1965, she utilized the port and docking facilities at Rosyth, Scotland, as a temporary home port, courtesy of the British Royal Navy. From 1 January to 29 May 1969, she underwent inactivation at Philadelphia.

    San Pablo was decommissioned on 29 May 1969 and struck from the Navy list on 1 June. After being used by the Ocean Science Center of the Atlantic Commission, Savannah, Georgia, she was sold on 14 September 1971 to Mrs. Margo Zahardis of Vancouver, Wash.

    San Pablo earned four battle stars for World War II service.

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...29OCT42 - PBY (VP-11) sinks Japanese submarine I-172 west of San Cristobal Island, Solomons, 13°01'S, 162°45'E..." HyperWar WebSite: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1942.html [16SEP2005]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...19JUN42 - Seaplane tender (destroyer) Ballard (AVD-10), directed to the scene by a PBY (VP-11), rescues 35 survivors (one of whom dies shortly after rescue) from Japanese carrier Hiryu that had been scuttled by destroyers Kazegumo and Yugumo on 5 June. They had been members of the engineering department, left below for dead in the abandonment of the ship..." HyperWar WebSite: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1942.html [16SEP2005]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Like Hogan's Goat. (Word War II Times February-March 1988 Volume 3 Number 2 Page 12 and 25)..." [04JUN2002]

    LIKE HOGAN'S GOAT


    VP-11 was a veteran of Naval campaigns from Kaneohe Bay to Leyte over a 35 month period.
    VP-11 Newsletter ThumbnailCameraPBY 71-P-1
    PBY 71-P-7 (manned by a VP-11 crew) just after attaching the heaving line from the USS Hulbert. Seen are AMM3/c Paul Herrin (legs visible) on the tail. Wing: RM3/c Gilbert, Ens. Douglas, RM3/c Bruck. Bow: Ens. Willis, LT Clar, and AMM2/c Frieze. (Conrad Frieze Collection)

    An old Navy descriptive phrase for total confusion is "fouled up like Hogan's goat." This is an accurate account of a PBY early wartime patrol that was, indeed, fouled up like Hogan's goat and therein lies a tale. It began in the early morning hours of Sunday, January 4, 1942, less than one month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, that destroyed all of our PBY Catalina seaplanes based at Kaneohe Bay on the windward side of Oahu.

    While awaiting replacement airplanes, personnel, and equipment, those of us on experienced VP-11 flight crews were assigned to fly as relief crews on the airplanes of patrol squadron VP-71 which had been rush- ed to Hawaii immediately after the at- tack for combat patrols.

    The ill-fated flight of 71-P-7 began at the 0415 on the seaplane ramp of the U.S. Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay. When I boarded the airplane to which my flight crew had been assigned for a 14 hour patrol, it was in the blackness preceding the first light of dawn. I was a third class aviation machinist mate and second mechanic on the crew of Lt. Carlton H. Clark.

    It seemed to be the beginning of just another routine and monotonous patrol. Ernie Davenport, AMM 2c and our enlisted plane captain, was already aboard. He had the little gasoline powered auxiliary power unit, the "put-putt," running and was checking equipment in the strange airplane. He gestured with his thumb to indicate that I was to take the first watch in the mechanic's tower up between the fuselage and the broad wing. Before climbing to the tower to check the instruments and start engines, I continued forward to the radio/navigation compartment. There was a strange third class radioman seated at the radio. He introduced himself as Gilbert. Our regular first radioman was in the sick bay and Gilbert had been assigned to replace him for the patrol. I didn't like it. Scanning the chart on the navigator's table, I felt a bit better.

    We had a milk run. The course ran 750 miles west-northwest toward Mid- way. The line ran just south of Niihoa and Necker Islands then out past French Frigate Shoals. A hundred miles beyond French Frigate we would cross over 50 miles to the north, then return to Oahu. We would have -' the tips of the submerged Hawaiian mountain chain that runs from the Hawaii to Midway for checkpoints.

    Sticking my head into the cockpit, I was surprised by another face strange to our flight crew. A young en- sign was seated in the raised left-hand seat. He introduced himself as Douglas, a pilot replacement assigned to Lt. Clark's crew for training his khaki uniform was crisply pressed and he was even wearing a necktie. I was to find later that he had just graduated from Pensacola and it was his first flight in a PBY.

    As I climbed into the tower seat, Lt. Clark and our co-pilot, Ensign Charles E. Willis, Jr., passed beneath me on their way forward. We started the two big Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 radial engines, the beach tractor lowered us down the ramp, and we taxied out for take-off just as the first light of dawn revealed the horizon seaward of Kaneohe Bay.

    As expected, the outbound leg of our patrol was routine and uneventful. Once level at our patrol altitude of 750 feet, Davenport handed up that first cup of hot black coffee. I sat comfortably sipping the strong brew and watched the rays of the rising sun touch the green and brown slopes of Kauai that drifted by off to port.

    Below my station and forward in the navigation compartment, Clark was turning navigation of our flight over to Ensign Douglas, our new resident pilot-in-training. Clark's reasoning was that the patrol would be a piece of cake since the neophyte navigator would have the check points of Niihau, Niihoa, Necker Island, and French Frigate Shoals both outbound and inbound. It would be an ideal exercise for the new officer.

    An hour after takeoff, Davenport relieved me in the tower and I went to the waist hatch aft to smoke a cigarette. Paul Herrin, our third mechanic and Bruck, our second radioman, were on watch at the gun blisters. Shortly afterward, Douglas came aft, notebook in hand, and announced that he was to take a drift sight. Sensing that he was not familiar with the drift sight pelorous in a PBY, I volunteered to set it up for him and he quickly accepted.

    Lying on my belly in the low tail compartment, I opened the tunnel hatch and installed the simple pelorous in its bracket. Before I backed out I lined up the grid with our track over the water and read the scale. We had five degrees right drift resulting from the 10 to 12-knot breeze that had now shifted to our port beam. The ensign confirmed the reading and went forward while I stowed the 4 pelorous and closed the hatch.

    An hour short of the end of our 1 patrol sector, we passed French 1 Frigate Shoals. The low-lying reef 1 was a distinct area of light green off: on the horizon to starboard. At 1130, Clark turned to starboard for our crossover leg during which he throttled back and descended to just over the surface for our altimeter check.

    I was back on watch in the tower and idly noted as I adjusted the altimeter to zero that the barometric pressure had dropped considerably since takeoff. I was not alarmed - weather and navigation were not the responsibility of an enlisted mechanic. The engines were my prime responsibility and they were droning steadily along on automatic lean carburetor setting - each using about 42 gallons of gasoline per hour.

    After the turn toward home at almost exactly noon, we cruised along serenely under a thickening cloud cover "fat, dumb, and happy."

    Unknown to anyone, however, En- sign Douglas was now committing the classic error of the neophyte navigator - he was applying the wind correction backward using the five- degree right drift that we had read five hours earlier. He had not taken a new drift sight after the turn.

    Meanwhile, un-noted, the wind had shifted further westward and was freshening on our starboard quarter. It apparently increased from a breeze to a wind of more than 25 knots early in the afternoon. The result was an undetected tailwind and several degrees left drift that compounded the ensign's wind steadily to the north of our intended track of 105 degrees and was increasing our ground speed by more than 25 percent.

    Another problem that was not detected until much later was that we were still near enough our intended track at 1330 hours that French Frigate Shoals was visible off to star- board as expected. I saw it from the tower. Willis saw it from the right- hand cockpit seat. Ernie Davenport saw it from the starboard gun blister. Unhappily, our new navigator failed to sight the low-lying strip of light green on the horizon.

    More than an hour later we passed just within sighting distance of Necker Island far off our starboard wingtip. Douglas sighted Necker but he plotted our position at 1410 hours as being abeam of French Frigate Shoals and on course. (Lt. Clark was to calculate later that, at that time, we were actually nearly 100 miles further along and were continuing to drift north of our intended course.)

    At about 1630, the patrol plane commander request a Kaneohe Bay ETA (estimated time of arrival) for transmission to the base. The 1830 calculated by Douglas seemed very logical without knowing about the tail- I wind that was still freshening. The c time was transmitted without question and we went back on radio, silence. ;

    By 1730 the weather was worsening.

    The cloud cover had become a solid gray overcast and our horizon was limited and indeterminate; therefore, no one was unduly alarmed when we failed to make landfall on Kauai off to starboard by 1800. The fact that we had not sighted little Niihoa an hour and a half earlier also went unnoticed.

    Doubts began to assail us when 1830, our transmitted ETA, came and went. Seven hundred feet beneath 71-P-7 was a lead color, wind-whipped ocean devoid of all but whitecaps and merging in the near distance with gray clouds at a very indefinite and darkening horizon.

    We flew doggedly on - to change course without reason would be foolhardy. An hour later as the murky daylight began to fade, it was obvious that the gremlins had moved the Hawaiian Islands. I was again on watch in the tower. Clark and Willis were bent intently over Douglas's chart checking his navigation while our AP (our enlisted pilot whose name has been lost) held the airplane steady on course.

    Eventually Clark determined that Douglas had been applying an incorrect wind drift backward since the turn at noon. We had obviously missed the islands an undetermined distance to the north but we still did not know what the tailwind had been all afternoon. Questions flew back and forth but no answers.

    Clark directed Gilbert to take a bearing on one of the Honolulu radio stations with the radio direction finder. The radioman twiddled the RDF loop for several minutes and failed to get a null. Both Willis and the AP tried it in turn but also failed to get a bearing. Apparently the null meter was out of order.

    Meanwhile, tension had pervaded 71-P-7. For more than an hour I had been leaning the carburetor settings until I had the fuel flow down below 36 gallons per hour. The cylinder head temperatures inched toward the red. It pained me to abuse those faithful big engines but behind my head the fuel tank gages were sinking steadily lower. I opened the cowl flaps then calculated roughly that we had a little over three hours of fuel remaining. Since 71-P-7 belonged to another squadron, I had no idea when the fuel gages had been calibrated. I had to take the readings on faith.

    At that point our logical and only recourse was to break the wartime radio silence, contact the base, and request a bearing on our transmission.

    Assuming that someone on one of the I islands was breaking blackout, he triumphantly brought the big PBY around onto course for the light. We J relaxed, believing that we would be off the coast of an island shortly. The light on the horizon behaved 1 strangely. It would wink out then j reappear, seeming oddly elongated. I

    After a few minutes of flying on a course of 286 degrees, it suddenly became painfully apparent that Clark's "light" was not a light at all- I it was a tiny sliver of the setting moon breaking through the thick cumulus clouds that blanketed the dark horizon.

    Now we were obviously totally lost and, with the setting of the moon, the night became inky black. Clark- reasoned that we had missed the islands to the north and east. He brought the airplane around to a course of 191 degrees and had Gilbert finally contact Pearl Harbor.

    Pearl answered our plaintive call and, after two minutes of our sending a repetitive signal, indicated that we were on a 130-degree bearing from the base.

    I sat uneasily in the folding seat of the port gun blister aft, straining my eyes into the darkness beneath the port wing tip.

    At 2225 a prolonged silence on the interphone was suddenly broken by the voice of the AP, "Hey - isn't that the loom of an island to port?"

    Nine pairs of eyes peered into the inky night. It was barely distinguishable on the black horizon but, beneath the darkness of the cloud cover, there was definitely a blacker presence. A partial break in the clouds and the last faint glow of the already set moon allowed us to make out a black bulk on the left and a lesser mass to the northwest. It could have been Haleakala and the north Maui mountains. The size of the nebulous island indicated that we were quite far off. Apparently we were 30 to 40 miles northeast of Maui.

    After we transmitted our supposed position of 40 miles off Maui bearing 060 degrees from Haleakala, Clark re- quested a fuel reading. Ernie's answer on the interphone was, "We're practically running on fumes, lieutenant. Actually, I'm reading about 75 gallons on each side but I can't vouch for these fuel gages. I've got the flow meters down to 34 gallons per hour - maybe a little less."

    "Lean 'em some more," Willis suggested. "Wean 'em if you can."

    "Can't, Mr. Willis," Ernie answered. "Cylinder heads are in the red and I've got the cowl flaps wide open. You ought to see the red glow from those hot exhaust manifolds."

    Clark did a quick mental calculation. "It'll be close," he said. "Might nave to go into the water short of Diamond Head." Advancing power a bare minimum, he climbed 71-P-7 from our patrol altitude of 750 feet to 1,500 feet and ordered the two depth charges and two 500 pound bombs jettisoned from the external wing racks. Simultaneously, he gave Gilbert a message to send advising the base of our action and repeating our presumed position at about 30 miles with our fuel running low.

    In the middle of the radio transmission, the engines suddenly quit. Those big Pratt & Whitney 1830's did not falter and sputter. They simply suck- ed up the last drop of 100-octane fuel and quit simultaneously as if the master ignition switch had been turn- ed off. Our radio transmission broke off in the middle as the CW long range radio, dependent on the generators for power, went dead.

    Clark dropped the nose of the suddenly silent PBY toward the unseen and wind-whipped ocean somewhere in the darkness below.

    "Whiskey, keep a sharp eye peeled for any sign of the surface," Clark said. He pulled up the nose of the airplane until the airspeed indicator dropped to 68 knots, barely above stalling, and made a gliding turn in the darkness to what he hoped was roughly the direction of the wind.

    Up in the tower, Davenport had frozen momentarily at the sudden cessation of the rumble of the engines. He came alive and hit the wobble pumps but the engines failed to so much as cough. Ernie swung his flashlight to the fuel gages and stared accusingly. The gages still showed 70 gallons in each obviously empty tank.

    The FLOATS DOWN light on the tower panel came on. Ernie slapped the control handle and the wingtip floats thudded into the down position for landing. The airplane was silent except for the steady sigh of the slipstream as we glided inexorably down for an eon of three or four minutes.

    In the cockpit, Willis suddenly caught the glimmer of a whitecap beneath the bow. "Surface! !" Clark heaved back on the yoke but, before the sluggish nose came up, the big PBY slammed into the top of a swell and bounced high.

    The PBY stalled and dropped. Clark was fighting the wheel in an endeavor to keep the wings level. The airplane seemed to hang for a minute then, as the nose began to drop, the bottom of the hull hit the water with another shuddering impact.

    The second bounce would be when a wing was likely to dig in and cartwheel us. I waited tensely but it did not come. We were on the dark and heaving ocean to stay. Spray and solid water cascaded against the side of the fuselage, then the airplane was pitching and rolling.

    In amazed relief at being down in one piece, no one moved or spoke for several long seconds. In the silence between crashing waves, I heard water in the bilges. My skin crawled - My God - the bottom.

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...PATROL WING TWO - U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION - PEARL HARBOR, T.H. - 20 Dec 1941..." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Pearl/PatWing2.html [08JAN2001]

    UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIRCRAFT
    PATROL WING ONE
    FLEET AIR DETACHMENT
    MCAS/NAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii
    1 January 1942.


    From: Commander Patrol Wing ONE.
    To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

    Subject: Report of Japanese Air Attack on Kaneohe Bay, T.H., - December 7, 1941.

    Reference: (a) Cincpac desp. 102102 of December 1941. (b) USS Hulbert Conf. ltr. A16-3/P15 (C-47) (c) USS Avocet Conf. ltr. A16-3 (039) (d) VP-11 Conf. ltr. of December 13, 1941. (e) VP-12 Conf. ltr. A16-3 (0100) of December 14, 1941. (f) VP-14 Conf. ltr. A16-3 of December 1941.

    The following report is submitted as the happenings on Sunday, December 7, 1941, in compliance with reference (a). References (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), were the reports of Unit Commanders of this Wing.

    The first intimation had that anything was wrong was when a message was received from a patrol plane on the Dawn Patrol stating that they had dropped a depth bomb on and had sunk an enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. (It was later discovered that a destroyer had attacked this submarine from close aboard and the patrol plane had added his bomb in assistance). Evidence seemed conclusive that the submarine was destroyed. When this message was received it seemed so impossible that the first reaction was that it was a case of mistaken identity as we had some of our submarines due to enter that morning. While investigating to insure that the information concerning our own submarines was in the hands of the patrolling aircraft, about nine (9) enemy fighters circled at low altitude over Haneohe and attacked with machine guns the control tower located on hill at Naval Air Station and the four patrol planes moored in the bay.

    This was followed by an attack on the planes on the ramp. This attack lasted for some fifteen minutes. The very first plane to attack attacked the Wing Commander's OS2U-1 on the landing mat. At the time a chief petty officer was turning over the propeller by hand and it was apparently thought to be a fighter preparing to take off. This plane was thoroughly riddled. After the first wave there was a few minutes' lull and then another attack by an estimated six to nine fighters. All attacks were directed at the planes on the ground, in the water, and at the hangar. But there was some straffing of cars and quarters incident to the main attack. The first attack set on fire all planes on the water and some of those on the beach. The second attack hit additional planes, setting them on fire. At the very beginning of the first attack there was immediate action on the part of the personnel to get machine guns in action against the attacking planes. This was done before the completion of the first attack and on the first attack at least two enemy planes had their gas tanks punctured. immediate action was taken to save the planes no then on fire and those not too far gone. personnel attempting this were severely straffed. During both of the above attacks, personnel were straffed on the road in automobiles attempting to get to the hangar area. After the two above attacks all efforts were directed at getting all planes that could be possibly saved clear from the area of the burning planes.

    About 0930 a formation of nine, 2 seater bombers, came in formation over the Bay, more or less following the coast line from Kahuka Point, at an altitude of about 1000 to 1500 feet and dropped bombs on the hangar occupied by Patrol squadrons ELEVEN and TWELVE. This attack caused the loss of the greatest number of personnel as considerable men were in the hangar getting replenishment ammunition. Two bombs hit in the hangar, two close alongside, and one dud hit in the hangar in wt Lieutenant Commander Buckley was supervising the obtaining of ammunition. He miraculously escaped other than minor injuries. Immediately behind this wave of bombers were nine additional bombers and it is uncertain whether or not they dropped bombs -- so much smoke was in the area and people stunned by the first wave that this point is uncertain. If they did not, it is certain that an additional drop was made by the first wave of bombers, aimed at the other hangar, but which fell between the hangar and the water, some falling in the water and did very little damage, except for holes in the parking area. This part is not a tribute to the bombing accuracy of the attacking planes as they were only a 1000 or 15000 feet high and did not drop, that both drops were by the first formation. These same observers contribute the belief that they did not drop the bombs because the central bomber in the leading plane had been killed, as the volume of machine gun fire was directed at the leading plane and tracers indicated that the nose of this plane was receiving severe punishment.

    The conduct of all personnel throughout the entire attack was magnificent, in fact, too much so. Had they not, with no protection, deliberately set themselves up with machine guns right in line with the drop of the attacking and straffing planes and near the object of their attack, we would have lost less men. it was, however, due to this reckless resistance that two enemy planes were destroyed and six or more were sent away with heavy gas leaks. Several of these planes that were damaged in this respect departed at high speeds to the north west, all in the same direction. One of the two planes definitely brought down was seen to land in the ocean, smoking before it landed. The other one (a fighter) was brought down within the limits of the station.

    After the bombing attack there was a third straffing attack at 10 o'clock. The two fighters destroyed, mentioned above, were on this last attack. There were no further attacks after this one just mentioned.

    A survey at this time reveals that all planes actually at the base were put out of commission (33 patrol planes, 1 OS2U-1 and the J2F-1 belonging to the Air Station). The three patrol planes not destroyed were the ones on the Dawn Patrol. One of these was attacked by a number of enemy fighters in the air, receiving considerable bullet holes, but was not stopped and has been operating ever since. These planes had to be considerably patched up. The hangar occupied by squadrons ELEVEN and TWELVE was destroyed. All records of those two squadrons were destroyed except the service records of the enlisted men of ELEVEN. All records of Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN are intact. No other buildings or equipment at this base was attacked. Although there were some straffing of quarters and cars incident to the main attack.

    The fire truck was destroyed by the bombing attack. All bombsights have been accounted for and are in good condition because they were stored in the Bombsight Vault which was not attacked. A large number of SBAE were destroyed, considerable number of machine guns, both .50 and .30 caliber, were destroyed in the planes.

    The conduct of all the personnel was magnificent. After careful consideration it is urgently recommended that the following persons should receive special recognition for their meritorious conduct in the face of enemy fire because their performance was courageous and outstanding:

    PATROL SQUADRON ELEVEN

    FOSS, R.S., Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R. (Deceased)
    SMARTT, J.G., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R. (Deceased)
    FORMOE, C.M., AMM1c., U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    MANNING, M.A., AMM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    WEAVER, L.D., Sea1c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    BUCKLEY, J.D., AOM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    ROBINSON, J.H., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    NASH, K. (n), Y1c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    BYRON, H.G., ACMM(0A), U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    CROWNOVER, J.T., RM1c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)

    PATROL SQUADRON TWELVE

    FOX, L. Jr., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R. Deceased)
    UHLMANN, R.W., Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R. (Deceased)
    INGRAM, G.W., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    LAWRENCE, C. (n) AMM2c, U.S. Navy Deceased)
    OTTERSTETTER, C.W., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    PORTERFIELD, R.K., AMM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    WATSON, R.A., AMM1c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    BROWN, W.S., AMM2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    GRIFFIN, D.T., AMM1c(NAP), U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    McCORMACK, J.J., Lieutenant, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    WALLANCE, M.R., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R. (Seriously Injured)
    HELM, T.W., III, RM1c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    LLEWELLYN, F.N., RM2c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    GRISHAM, L.A., ACOM(PA), U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    LYONS, D.S., AMM1c(NAP), U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)

    PATROL SQUADRON FOURTEEN

    NEWMAN, L.G., AMM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
    WALTERS, J.E., AOM3c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
    JONES, E.L., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)


    [signed] K. McGINNIS

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Wing One Report for Pearl Harbor Attack - 1 January 1942..." WebSite: Naval Historical Site http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/ph12.htm [08APR2005]

    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
    805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
    WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060


    Patrol Wing One Report for Pearl Harbor Attack
    A16-3(1)/UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
    AIRCRAFT, SCOUTING FORCE
    PATROL WING ONE
     
    O2  
      FLEET AIR DETACHMENT
    Naval Air Station
    Kaneohe Bay, T.H.
    1 January 1942.

    From:Commander Patrol Wing ONE. 
    To:Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
      
    Subject:Report of Japanese Air Attack on Kaneohe Bay, T.H., - December 7, 1941.
      
    Reference:(a) Cincpac desp. 102102 of December 1941.
    (b) USS Hulbert Conf. ltr. A16-3/P15 (C-47) of December 8, 1941
    (c) USS Avocet Conf. ltr. A16-3 (039) of December 12, 1941
    (d) VP-11 Conf. ltr. of December 13, 1941.
    (e) VP-12 Conf. ltr. A16-3 (0100) of December 14, 1941.
    (f) VP-14 Conf. ltr. A16-3 of December 1941.



    1. The following report is submitted as the happenings on Sunday, December 7, 1941, in compliance with reference (a). References (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), were the reports of Unit Commanders of this Wing.

    2. The first intimation had that anything was wrong was when a message was received from a patrol plane on the Dawn Patrol stating that they had dropped a depth bomb on and had sunk an enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. (It was later discovered that a destroyer had attacked this submarine from close aboard and the patrol plane had added his bomb in assistance). Evidence seemed conclusive that the submarine was destroyed. When this message was received it seemed so impossible that the first reaction was that it was a case of mistaken identity as we had some of our submarines due to enter that morning. While investigating to insure that the information concerning our own submarines was in the hands of the patrolling aircraft, about nine (9) enemy fighters circled at low altitude over Kaneohe and attacked with machine guns the control tower located on hill at Naval Air Station and the four patrol planes moored in the bay.

    3. This was followed by an attack on the planes on the ramp. This attack lasted for some fifteen minutes. The very first plane to attack attacked the Wing Commander's OS2U-1 on the landing mat. At the time a chief petty officer was turning over the propeller by hand and it was apparently thought to be a fighter preparing to take off. This plane was thoroughly riddled. After the first wave there was a few minutes' lull and then another attack by an estimated six to nine fighters. All attacks were directed at the planes on the ground, in the water, and at the hangar. But there was some straffing of cars and quarters incident to the main attack. The first attack set on fire all planes on the water and some of those on the beach. The second attack hit additional planes, setting them on fire. At the very beginning of the first attack there was immediate action on the part of the personnel to get machine guns in action against the attacking planes. This was done before the completion of the first attack and on the first attack at least two enemy planes had their gas tanks punctured. Immediate action was taken to save the planes not then on fire and those not too far gone. Personnel attempting this were severely straffed. During both of the above attacks, personnel were straffed on the road in automobiles attempting to get to the hangar area. After the two above attacks all efforts were directed at getting all planes that could be possibly saved clear from the area of the burning planes.

    4. About 0930 a formation of nine, 2 seater bombers, came in formation over the Bay, more or less following the coast line from Kahuka Point, at an altitude of about 1000 to 1500 feet and dropped bombs on the hangar occupied by Patrol Squadrons VP-11 and VP-12. This attack caused the loss of the greatest number of personnel as considerable men were in the hangar getting replenishment ammunition. Two bombs hit in the hangar, two close alongside, and one dud hit in the hangar in which Lieutenant Commander Buckley was supervising the obtaining of ammunition. He miraculously escaped other than minor injuries. Immediately behind this wave of bombers were nine additional bombers and it is uncertain whether or not they dropped bombs -- so much smoke was in the area and people stunned by the first wave that this point is uncertain. If they did not, it is certain that an additional drop was made by the first wave of bombers, aimed at the other hangar, but which fell between the hangar and the water, some falling in the water and did very little damage, except for holes in the parking area. This part is not a tribute to the bombing accuracy of the attacking planes as they were only a 1000 or 15000 feet high and did not drop, that both drops were by the first formation. These same observers contribute the belief that they did not drop the bombs because the central bomber in the leading plane had been killed, as the volume of machine gun fire was directed at the leading plane and tracers indicated that the nose of this plane was receiving severe punishment.

    5. The conduct of all personnel throughout the entire attack was magnificent, in fact, too much so. Had they not, with no protection, deliberately set themselves up with machine guns right in line with the drop of the attacking and straffing planes and near the object of their attack, we would have lost less men. It was, however, due to this reckless resistance that two enemy planes were destroyed and six or more were sent away with heavy gas leaks. Several of these planes that were damaged in this respect departed at high speeds to the north west, all in the same direction. One of the two planes definitely brought down was seen to land in the ocean, smoking before it landed. The other one (a fighter) was brought down within the limits of the station.

    6. After the bombing attack there was a third straffing attack at 10 o'clock. The two fighters destroyed, mentioned above, were on this last attack. There were no further attacks after this one just mentioned.

    7. A survey at this time reveals that all planes actually at the base were put out of commission (33 patrol planes, 1 OS2U-1 and the J2F-1 belonging to the Air Station). The three patrol planes not destroyed were the ones on the Dawn Patrol. One of these was attacked by a number of enemy fighters in the air, receiving considerable bullet holes, but was not stopped and has been operating ever since. These planes had to be considerably patched up. The hangar occupied by squadrons VP-11 and VP-12 was destroyed. All records of those two squadrons were destroyed except the service records of the enlisted men of VP-11. All records of VP-14 are intact. No other buildings or equipment at this base was attacked. Although there were some straffing of quarters and cars incident to the main attack.

    8. The fire truck was destroyed by the bombing attack. All bombsights have been accounted for and are in good condition because they were stored in the Bombsight Vault which was not attacked. A large number of SBAE were destroyed, considerable number of machine guns, both .50 and .30 caliber, were destroyed in the planes.

    9. The conduct of all the personnel was magnificent. After careful consideration it is urgently recommended that the following persons should receive special recognition for their meritorious conduct in the face of enemy fire because their performance was courageous and outstanding:

      VP-11
      FOSS, R.S., Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R.(Deceased)
      SMARTT, J.G., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R.(Deceased)
      FORMOE, C.M., AMM1c., U.S. Navy(Deceased)
      MANNING, M.A., AMM3c, U.S. Navy(Deceased)
      WEAVER, L.D., Sea1c, U.S. Navy(Deceased)
      BUCKLEY, J.D., AOM3c, U.S. Navy(Deceased)
      ROBINSON, J.H., Sea2c, U.S. Navy(Deceased)
      NASH, K. (n), Y1c, U.S. Navy(Seriously Injured)
      BYRON, H.G., ACMM(PA), U.S. Navy(Seriously Injured)
      CROWNOVER, J.T., RM1c, U.S. Navy(Seriously Injured)
       
      VP-12
      FOX, L. Jr., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R. (Deceased)
      UHLMANN, R.W., Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R. (Deceased)
      INGRAM, G.W., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      LAWRENCE, C. (n) AMM2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      OTTERSTETTER, C.W., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      PORTERFIELD, R.K., AMM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      WATSON, R.A., AMM1c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      BROWN, W.S., AMM2c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      GRIFFIN, D.T., AMM1c(NAP), U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      McCORMACK, J.J., Lieutenant, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
      WALLANCE, M.R., Ensign, A-V(N), U.S.N.R. (Seriously Injured)
      HELM, T.W., III, RM1c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
      LLEWELLYN, F.N., RM2c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
      GRISHAM, L.A., ACOM(PA), U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
      LYONS, D.S., AMM1c(NAP), U.S. Navy(Seriously Injured)
       
      VP-14
      NEWMAN, L.G., AMM3c, U.S. Navy (Deceased)
      WALTERS, J.E., AOM3c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)
      JONES, E.L., Sea2c, U.S. Navy (Seriously Injured)

    [signed]
    K. McGINNIS

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Black Cats prowled after the Battle of Midway By Geoge Poulas VP-11 Squadron. (Word War II Times February-March 1988 Volume 3 Number 2 Page 4 and 33)..." Contributed by WINTER, George B. pbycat@bellsouth.net WEBSITE: http://www.vpnavy.org/winter.html[03JUN2002]

    BLACK CATS PROWLED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
    By Geoge Poulas VP-11 Squadron

    VP-11 Newsletter ThumbnailCameraSquadron PictureSquadron Picture (VP-11) taken at Palm Island near Townsville, Queensland, Australia, 1943.Squadron Commander Campbell is fifth man from lest (Joe Higgs Collection)

    Immediately after the Battle of Midway we learned that VP-ll would be permanently deployed to the South Pacific commencing about July 1, 1942. The flight from NAS Kaneohe to Suva was made in three legs with overnight fueling and rest stops at Palmyra and Canton Islands.

    Section by section, the PBY's departed daily. I was in the last section to leave and, by coincidence it was July 7, 1942, my 25th birthday. On arrival at Suva, we learned that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Island chain. In conjunction with the excellent harbor at Tulagi, 20 miles across the channel they would establish a major base to support their attacks on New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand.

    We also learned that Suva would not be our permanent base, but rather a staging area for further deployment. For the time being, six crews would remain in Fiji and the remaining nine 11 would redeploy to Noumea and Efate at New Caledonia. I would stay at Fiji

    Since Suva is on the wrong side of I the island for optimum range to patrol t Solomon Island sea lane traffic, I Seabees were assigned to build us a (temporary operating base at a quiet natural harbor known as Saweni Bay (near Latoka, the second largest city in Fiji. I

    On August 2 we moved in from Suva 1 and established a daily three-airplane patrol with sectors chosen to guard for possible "end around" surprises by the Japanese fleet during the Guadalcanal landings. These patrols were for the most part routine, but extremely interesting from the stand- point of the number of picturesque small volcanic islands. In every respect they have conformed to the mental concept of what isolated native islands with beautiful sandy beaches, thick coconut palm groves and scantily clad natives should look like.

    On August 25, we at Saweni learned that the Marines had captured Tulagi and Henderson Field on E Guadalcanal. There would be no t retreating to Fiji and New Caledonia t per the back-up plan. Our orders were to discontinue operations and join the rest of the squadron based on the aircraft tender USS Curtis at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides Island' group.

    Upon arrival at that destination on August 26, we learned that they had been repositioned aboard smaller tenders 400 miles closer to Guadalcanal at Graciosa Bay on the island of Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Island group. We immediately took off for that destination.

    At Ndeni we found the remainder of our squadron and a detachment of VP-23 PBY-5's operating from the tenders USS Mackinac and USS Ballard. Operations during the next 16 days were probably the most extensive by any group during any period. Among my flights was one of 18.4 hours to night track a powerful Japanese fleet which included five battleships and their escorts.

    Contact with the enemy was made every day. Five Kawanishi four-engine seaplanes were engaged in battle by PBY's with one shot down by Lt. Norm Brady and his VP-23 crew. Two PBY's had to make open sea landings after encounters. The crews were picked up by our destroyers within two days but there was one casualty. Two submarines were at- tacked but they got away. Lt. Carlton Clark made a medium-level bombing attack on a single Japanese destroyer, and was hit severely by the destroyer's guns. He landed his crippled PBY at sea and the crew was picked up by the destroyer and taken prisoner.

    Before dawn on the morning of September 11, a Japanese submarine surfaced at the entrance of Graciosa Bay, and commenced firing at the tenders USS Mackinac and USS Ballard and the PBY's at the buoys. Ballard slipped its anchor and proceeded at full speed to find the submarine but it submerged and escaped. After this event, Graciosa Bay was ordered evacuated with all tenders and PBY's to return to Espiritu Santo.

    Our new home at Espiritu Santo was the USS Curtis a large well- equipped tender. Upon arrival, I reported to the sick bay and was immediately grounded by the flight surgeon.

    After a period of recuperation which included rotational rest and recreation at Auckland, New Zealand, VP-ll crews were back performing the PBY's primary mission of frustrating the Japanese attempts to retake Guadalcanal and Tulagi. During one of the night fleet battles, our cruisers had fought their battleships to a standoff, except they were struck by torpedoes launched from sub- marines that had sneaked into the area through the openings in the island chain. Thereafter, when a night battle was anticipated, PBY's per- formed night patrols along the northeastern island gaps to prevent the Japanese submarine end-around entries.
    VP-11 Newsletter ThumbnailCameraLT George Poulos at a native village

    A front row seat to one of these night fleet battles was an awesome experience with unbelievable fire intensity on both sides. In one instance, I witnessed the death of one of our cruisers which suffered direct magazine hit and blew up with a fireball climbing thousands of feet.

    By now it was known that the Japanese had established a major base at Tonolei Harbor on Bougainville, the northern most island in the Solomon chain. This greatly reduced their supply line length from Truk and therefore their attacks would intensify. In mid-October, our Intelligence had uncovered the fact that a very large enemy carrier force was being assembled there. On October 22, Jack Coley, "Whiskey" Willis and I had torpedoes loaded under our port wings and made plans to fly 900 miles for a night attack on the Japanese fleet. Since room within the harbor would be greatly restricted, torpedoes were set to arm after a 200 yard run. We entered the harbor at about 0200 hours on October 23, undetected and caught the Japanese Fleet at anchor except for destroyers on sentinel duty on the entrance.

    Once inside the harbor the formation split up with each of us seeking our own target. Ships were visible everywhere.

    At 400 yards I was stabilized at 90 knots and 25 feet. At 300 yards, flying 80 knots and 20 feet, I pulled the release handle and called for full power.

    Out of my left eye I saw the torpedo enter the water and start a true course.

    During the pull-up to get over the cruiser I pulled the handle to release two 500-pound bombs. The PBY shuddered as the weapons exploded. The crew members at the waist hatches reported direct hits but it was not possible to determine the extent of the damage.

    Fleet units started to move out of Tonolei and other harbors the next day and it was our assignment to find and track them. Several contacts of enemy ships were made during the day patrols on October 23, 24 and 25, and at night PBY -5's armed with torpedoes and two 500-pound bombs went out to attack. Among the VP-ll crews that made night search and at- tack missions during these days were Lt. Bob Corlett, Lt. Joe Hill, Lt. (jg) Charles Muckenthaler, Lt. (jg) I George Clute and Lt. (jg) George Enloe.

    It was apparent that the various segments would join up for a major: battle with our fleet consisting of the j carriers Hornet and Enterprise with c their escorts. J

    This battle became known as the I Battle of Santa Cruz, where we lost the Hornet. By sending their ships out] to sea in sections the Japanese had ~ done an excellent job in concealing J the location of their fleet.

    That morning PBY patrols were launched in complete darkness two hours ahead of previous scheduling with a briefing that a battle was in the making. We did not know if the Japanese Fleet had formed or their location.

    At about 0630 hours we found a large force with four carriers and their escorts. It was apparent that the carriers had already launched their planes to attack our fleet, because their decks were clear. The only airplanes in sight were several Zeros flying overhead coverage. The japs apparently knew where our carriers were and we had to send their position to enable our carrier planes to attack.

    I climbed a few hundred feet to see the entire fleet, and ordered a quick count then a retreat to extend the trailing wire antenna to send the position report. Apparently we proceeded too rapidly because of harassment by ship fire and there was a difference in the ship types among crew members; one was certain he saw at least one battleship. All agreed concerning the number of carriers.

    If we had not found the Japanese Fleet, the whole day would have been a complete disaster to the U.S. Navy. Although Admiral Halsey issued the orders to attack from Noumea at about 0530 hours, the numerous reports of small ship units at diverse locations undoubtedly created confusion aboard our carriers.

    Having sent our message we returned for an exact ship count and type. Four Zeros suddenly left their umbrella cover and took after us. This I did not anticipate since I considered that Japanese cover planes would not break their umbrella for anything but attacking carrier planes.

    It was now one hour since we made our initial contact and still our carrier planes had not arrived to attack. We had knowledge of nine previous PBY's which had made contact with Japanese carrier fleets and had been shot down. Would we be the tenth? I was determined not to be. There was very little wind at sea that day with no discernable white caps. Instead, there were huge swells in the water that rose to 15 to 20 feet. By the time the first Zero was making his firing run on us, I was at the bottom of a trough looking up at water on both sides.

    As a swell terminated, I would pick up either the port or starboard wing and slide into another trough. As a Zero approached on a firing run I turned quickly into his line of sight to shorten his run and tighten his turn as much as he dared flying so close to the water. Their attack was totally ineffective, the nearest they came was spattering of bullets 20 to 30 yards behind us, nor was their attack one of long duration.

    Although the U.S. Navy cannot claim a victory at the Battle of Santa Cruz, I consider it one of the most important of the war and one that swung the pendulum to our side. For the Japanese it was a "do or die" battle. They had to annihilate our fleet at this encounter if they were ever to regain Guadalcanal and Tulagi - a draw would not do. They did. sink the Hornet, but we inflicted severe damage to several of their ships including two carriers.

    They failed, and from that day the momentum swung to our side and we definitely went on the offensive. More and more PBY crews went on night bombings and many other enemy harassment missions. One of these missions the message, "The Black Cat flies tonight", was sent to alert the Marines on Guadalcanal; thus coining the phrase which characterized PBY night operations henceforth.

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: APPENDIX3 Submarines Sunk by Patrol Squadrons During World War II - Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm[04MAY2001]

    I-172, 29 October 1942
    Type: 1 st Class, Class A Fleet Submarine, Kaidai
    Type 6A Laid Down: 1931, Mitsubishi, Kobe
    Commissioned: 6 April 1935
    Commander: 1942, LCDR Takeshi Ota
    Career: Assign: SubRon 3, originally designated I-72, redesignated I-172 on 20 May 1942. Modified as a transport in early 1942, accom-modating a 46-foot Daihatsu landing craft, am-phibious tank, or other external equipment.
    Successes: None

    Fate: I-172 was listed as missing by the Japanese navy after 28 October 1942, in the vicinity of the Solomons, the operational area of VP-11's PBY-5 Catalinas at the time of the claimed sinking. Official credit for I-172 was given by the U.S. Navy to Southard (DMS 10), for a sinking on 10 November 1942, at the south end of Indispensable Strait, position 10°13'S, 161°09'E. Japanese records indicate that the submarine claimed by Southard was actually I-15. On 29 October 1942, Lieutenant F. Joe Hill sighted a submarine while on search at 13°15'S, 162°45'E about three miles on the starboard beam. The sub crash-dived and was below the surface when Hill dropped his two 650-lb depth charges. A large quantity of oil appeared and remained on the surface during the next day. The submarine was lost with all 91 hands aboard, including Rear Admiral Yoshisuke Okamoto, Commander of the 12th Squadron of the Kure Submarine Flotilla. I-172 was the fourteenth Japanese submarine lost during the war.

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...I am an aviation historian resident in a suburb of Perth, Western Australia. I am preparing a Masters thesis titled "The Air War in Western Australia 1939-1945".From March 1942 to August 1944 we had Patrol Wing Ten (Fleet Air Wing Ten from 01 NOV 42) based at Crawley on the Swan River, near Perth. PWTen appears to have doubled as a training and local patrol unit, with patrol squadrons being rotated as the war in the Southwest Pacific progressed. From the Wing's War Diary I have ascertained that the following squadrons were present at Crawley: VP-101 (includes merged VP-21, VP-22 and VP-102 after the evacuation of Java in MAR 42), VP-11, VP-33, VP-34, VP-52. After FAWTen left Perth in AUG 44, a utility training unit, VS-61 continued until well into 1945.I am seeking information on these squadrons when they were in Western Australia. I know of their bases at Geraldton and Exmout Gulf (POTSHOT) but I have a problem with the mobile base, "Heron Haven". I have a copy of Messimer's "In the Hands of Fate" and a few other published references, so have an overall picture.Any help would be appreciated..." Contributed by Lindsay J. Peet (Mr.) ppeetlj@ic-net.com.au [22JUL98]

    UPDATE "...Lindsay, Since our recent communication I have delved into the matter of Heron Haven, and have enjoyed doing so.

    Since my interest begins with aircraft and their squadrons, I approached this exercise from an "aircraft on aggressive ops. using Seaplane Tenders" point of view. This allowed me to rule out some matters, such as :---



  • 1 Regular seaplane patrols from such as Geraldton.


  • 2 Seaplane mine laying ops from West Bay in Napier Broome Bay which began 17Nov44.

    I set aside some matters temporarily, being :---


  • 1 The seven and then five USN PBY flying Crawley to Townsend Haven to Darwin in Jun43.


  • 2 The joined usage of "Townsend Haven(Heron Haven)".

    I then found that only RAAF Catalinas were thereafter used on aggressive ops from [or returning to] WA advanced bases in my search timeframe and area. I shall list these under "locality" headings, of which there are just three, being


  • 1 Exmouth Gulf


  • 2 Cygnet Bay


  • 3 Yampi Sound
    Exmouth Gulf.

    In Aug43 and Nov43, RAAF Catalinas did mining sorties to Soerabaya Harbour. They flew Darwin, Soerabaya, Heron Haven for fuel, then return to Darwin.

    In both months, tender Preston is mentioned for refuelling.

    Pilot Honan was on the Nov43 Sortie, describes his career in book "That's That", clearly states Heron Haven was at Exmouth Gulf, shows it so on a map.

    Cygnet Bay.

    In Jan44, RAAF investigated Cygnet Bay for use by mine laying Catalinas. It was accepted for RAAF use, perhaps because of radar station at Cape Leveque and protective airfield at Derby. Tidal mudflats were a problem.

    Tender Preston laid moorings and supported the Catalinas. The sorties were flown Cygnet Bay - Balikpapan - Cygnet Bay.

    Cygnet Bay was used only once for RAAF ops, for a set of three mine laying sorties to Balikpapan on 20, 22, and 24Feb44.

    Yampi Sound. [Codename "Shecat"]

    In Apr44 Yampi Sound was selected as advanced base for more minelaying ops to Balikpapan. A radar station was at Cockatoo Island. Tender Childs set the moorings.

    A set of three ops were done this month, flying Yampi Sound - Balikpapan - Yampi Sound.

    More sets of ops were done from Yampi Sound in May, June, and July44, to Balikpapan and to Soerabaya.

    After Jul44, no more aggressive Catalina ops were done from WA coast until West Bay came into use.

    *****************

    So, from the above, I'm happy that Heron Haven was a "common usage" name for Exmouth Gulf, and only Exmouth Gulf. I can't see it as a formal "code name" since it could relate to the operational vessel USS Heron. I see there is a "Heron Point" adjacent Learmonth in Exmouth Gulf.

    Heron may have done a reconnaisance to Cygnet Bay in early Jun43, prior to the VP-101 flights to Darwin in Jun43. As for Heron's dalliance in the Dampier Archipeligo, perhaps the fishing was good. Where was General Blamey just then? No jest!

    There is a "Townshend River" at Cygnet Bay.Perhaps it was Cygnet Bay, by whatever name, where the USN Catalinas refuelled on their way to Darwin in Jun43. Perhaps the USN avoided Exmouth Gulf in Jun43 as the Japanese bombed there [no physical damage] in May43, after which the submarine base was closed.

    I would love to read about the VP-101 flights in context, would appreciate any info you might be able to provide...

    Hope this helps, best wishes, Bruce G..." Contributed by Wynnum B Graham wbg@bigpond.com [26AUG98]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...11SEP42...Transfer of Patrol Wing ONE to South Pacific Area...allocated three patrol squadrons to the South Pacific Area. At the request of Commander Patrol Wing ONE, Commander, U. S. Naval Air Forces U. S. Pacific Fleet has designated Patrol Squadrons ELEVEN, SEVENTY-TWO, and NINETY-ONE as the squadrons assigned to Patrol Wing ONE and has allocated to Patrol Wing TWO all remaining squadrons in the Hawaiian Area..." Contributed by Bill Podbreger SAIL@D-WEB.NET

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...15OCT42--BLACK CATS--This operation, probably began with Patrol Wing 10 in Australia at the beginning of the war.At the battle of Midway, three planes from VP-24 and one plane from VP-51 made a night torpedo attack on Japanese ships. In the South Pacific on the night of 15 and 16 OCT, LTjg Haber of VP-24, LTjg Muchenthaler of VP-11, were search planes for LCDR Cobb of VP-11 and LTjg Rothenburg of VP-51 with torpodes. Torpodes run made with one hit...."George Winter pbycat@bellsouth.net

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...23OCT42--91-P-3 BUNO 04513 sights a Japanese Task Force.This is the first sighting in what will become the Battle of Santa Cruz.PPC, unidentified, probably from VP-11 or VP-51..."George Winter pbycat@bellsouth.net


    Circa 1941 - 1945

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: Naval Historical Center, Department Of The Navy, Washington, D. C http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/dictvol2.htm [28APR2001]
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    Squadron History:  VPB-11

    Lineage

    Established as Torpedo & Bombing Squadron NINETEEN-D14 (VT-19D14) on 7 February 1924.
    Redesignated Torpedo & Bombing Squadron SIX-D14 (VT-6D14) on 1 July 1927.
    Redesignated Patrol Squadron SIX-B (VP-6B) on 1 April 1931.
    Redesignated Patrol Squadron SIX-F (VP-6F) on 17 July 1933.
    Redesignated Patrol Squadron SIX (VP-6) on 1 October 1937.
    Redesignated Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE (VP-23) on 1 July 1939.
    Redesignated Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (VP-11) on 1 August 1941.
    Redesignated Patrol Bombing Squadron ELEVEN (VPB-11) on 1 October 1944.
    Disestablished on 20 June 1945.

    Squadron Insignia and Nickname

    VP-6F was the originator of the squadron's first insignia in 1933. Although official approval of the design was never requested of BuAer, defacto recognition of the new insignia appeared when it was reproduced in the 20 October 1933 issue of the Bureau of Aeronautics Newsletter. The design selected was the Pegasus, a winged horse from Greek mythology. To the Greeks, Pegasus represented the strength embodied in the warhorse combined with the advantage of aerial agility. Colors: white horse with shaded gold wings, on blue field inside red circular border. The same insignia continued in use by the squadron through all its numerous redesignations.

    Nickname: None known.

    Chronology of Significant Events

    (Squadron history from 7 Feb 1924 to WWII removed as not pertinent to this website.)

    7 Dec 1941: During the attack on Pearl Harbor the majority of the squadron’s aircraft at NAS Kaneohe were destroyed or damaged beyond repair. One witness to the carnage, an Army P-40 pilot, Lieutenant George S. Welch, 46th Pursuit Group, Wheeler Field, stated that the Japanese dive bombers were stacked up over the airfields in a "...regular traffic pattern around the field. They never got more than 100 to 200 feet high . . . they flew around with their pattern to the right. When they returned, they used the same formation and signals that we do — shallow left run, wiggling the wings. They would come back into formation, peel off and come down again. There was no resistance . . . so that they had a perfect pattern, and could pick out individual ships that they could see weren’t on fire and shoot at them with both their 7.7s and 30-mm cannon."

    1 Apr 1942: Losses were replaced in April with new PBY-5 seaplanes from the U.S., equipped with ASE radar for spotting ships on the ocean surface. Sector searches around Oahu were begun as soon as crews could be checked out on the new equipment.

    30 Apr 1942: A two-aircraft detachment was sent to Johnston Island for sector searches. Two new crews relieved the detachment each week. On 29 May the detachment size was increased to six aircraft.

    20 May 1942: A three-plane detachment was sent to Barking Sands, Kauai. On 22 May the detachment was increased by three aircraft.

    1 Jul 1942: VP-11 deployed to Suva, Fiji Islands. Over the next several months the squadron would be moved from Suva to Noumea, New Caledonia, Tongatabu and Espiritu Santo to conduct search and reconnaissance missions in connection with the landings at Guadalcanal and other fleet operations in the South Pacific.

    13 Jul 1942: A three-plane detachment was sent to Noumea.

    17 Jul 1942: One aircraft was dispatched to Auckland, returning on 19 July.

    26 Jul 1942: A three-plane detachment was sent to Tongatabu, with two aircraft returning to Suva on 28 July.

    1 Aug 1942: The Noumea detachment was increased by three aircraft. Tender support was provided by Curtiss (AV 4). The next day the detachment was further supplemented by two aircraft from VP-14.

    4 Aug 1942: VP-11 headquarters was shifted from Suva to Saweni Beach with six aircraft, the remainder still based at Noumea. The headquarters group was provided tender support by McFarland (AVD 14).

    11 Aug 1942: The Noumea detachment was redeployed with Curtiss (AV 4) to Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides.

    7 Sep 1942: VP-11 claimed one submarine kill but a postwar review of Japanese records indicates no loss of a Japanese submarine on that date and location.

    29 Oct 1942: Lieutenant F. Joe Hill and his crew spoted a surface submarine about three miles off his starboard beam. The submarine crash-dived and was below the surface when Hill dropped his two 650 pound depth charges. A large quantity of oil appeared and remained on the surface the following day. Postwar records indicate the submarine sunk by Lieutenant Hill was I-172, Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Ota commanding. I-172 was lost with all 91 hands aboard, including Rear Admiral Yoshisuke Okamoto, Commander of the 12th Squadron of the Kure Submarine Flotilla.

    5 Nov 1942: VP-11 claimed a third submarine sunk but a postwar review of Japanese records indicates no loss of a Japanese submarine on that date and location.

    1 Feb 1943: VP-11 was withdrawn from combat and returned to NAS San Diego, Calif., for refit and home leave.

    20 Apr 1943: The reforming of the squadron was completed on this date. Aircrews flew the transpac to Kaneohe on 21 April, while the remainder of ground personnel and assets departed on transports. Upon arrival all hands undertook intensive combat preparation while simultaneously conducting patrols over the ocean in the Hawaiian area.

    22 May 1943: Combat training was completed at Kaneohe. VP-11 aircrews departed for Perth, Australia, followed later by ground crew and squadron assets in transports. Upon arrival in Perth on 8 June aircrews commenced combat search and reconnaissance patrols in the southwest Pacific under the operational control of FAW-10.

    9 Sep 1943: VP-11 departed for Brisbane, and then to New Guinea and Palm Island. The squadron came under the operational control of FAW-17 and relieved VP-101. Black Cat (PVY’s painted black) nighttime operations commenced in the areas around New Guinea, New Ireland, and the Bismarck Sea.

    1 Oct–19 Nov 1943: VP-11 was based aboard San Pablo (AVP 30) in Jenkins Bay. Night searches for surface ships were conducted, and bombing attacks on Japanese installations on Garove Island were con-ducted over several nights. On 9 October, Half Moon (AVP 26) relieved San Pablo.

    16 Nov 1943: Lieutenant Jack D. Cruze and his crew were exceptionally busy during the period 1 to 9 November. They attacked Japanese facilities in the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Sea under severe weather conditions and strafed enemy merchant vessels, barges, shore installations and wharves. On the night of 16 November they located the biggest target yet, a Japanese task force. Despite the heavy concentration of fire from the escorts, Cruze made a low-level bombing attack that destroyed a large transport in the task force. For his courage under fire and aggressive pursuit of the enemy during this period, Lieutenant Cruze was awarded the Navy Cross.

    19 Nov 1943: VP-11, relieved at Jenkins Bay by VP-52, reported to Port Moresby to relieve VP-101. On 23 November Black Cat operations were commenced in conjunction with daytime attacks by the 5th Bombardment Group, 5th USAAF.

    30 Dec 1943: VP-11 transferred to Palm Island, Australia, and was taken off combat operations. Routine administrative and passenger flights were conducted daily to Port Moresby, Samari and Brisbane.

    10 Feb 1944: The squadron returned to Perth to conduct convoy patrols in Australian waters under the operational control of FAW-10.

    19 Jul 1944: VP-11 returned to New Guinea and Schouten Islands for Black Cat night combat operations under the operational control of FAW-17. A three-aircraft detachment was sent to Woendi Lagoon, Biak.

    23 Aug 1944: VP-11 continued to conduct Black Cat operations after its transfer to Middleburg Island.

    18 Sep 1944: The squadron continued Black Cat operations while based on Schouten Island and Morotai until 21 September when daytime operations were then started. Daytime operations consisted of antisubmarine patrols and air-sea rescue missions in the South Pacific.

    1 Oct 1944: VP-11 was redesignated VPB-11. On 6 October the squadron was stationed at Morotai with tender support provided by San Pablo (AVP 30). Air-sea rescue and routine ASW patrols were conducted daily. On 12 October half of the squadron was quartered aboard Orca (AVP 49) to provide more room for the crews.

    14 Nov 1944: The squadron was relocated to Woendi with 15 aircraft. On 5 December VPB-11 was moved to Morotai, then back to Woendi on the 11th for boarding on Pocomoke (AV 9) and transportation back to the U.S.

    19 Dec 1944: VPB-11 was officially withdrawn from combat and 15 aircraft and crews departed Woendi for return to NAS San Diego, Calif.

    20 Jun 1945: VPB-11 was disestablished at NAS San Diego, Calif.

     

    Home Port Assignments

    Location Date of Assignment
    NAS Kaneohe, Hawaii 1940
    NAS San Diego, Calif. Feb 1943
    NAS Kaneohe, Hawaii Apr 1943
    NAS San Diego, Calif. Dec 1944

     

    Commanding Officers

    Name Date Assumed Command
    LCDR Leon W. Johnson 22 Jul 1941
    LCDR Francis R. Jones 11 Dec 1941
    LT W. P. Schroeder (actg) Apr 1942
    LCDR Clayton C. Marcy 4 May 1942
    LCDR C. M. Campbell 16 Mar 1943
    LCDR Thomas S. White 24 May 1944

     

    Aircraft Assignment

    Type of Aircraft Date Type First Received
    PBY-5 Nov 1941

     

    Major Overseas Deployments

    Date of Departure Date of Return Wing Base of  Operations Type of Aircraft Area of Operations
    1 Jul 1942 * FAW-17 Fiji Islands PBY-5 SoPac
    McFarland (AVD 14)
    13 Jul 1942 * FAW-17 Noumea PBY-5 SoPac
    Curtiss (AV 4)
    11 Aug 1942 1 Feb 1943 FAW-17 Espiritu Santo PBY-5 SoPac
    Curtiss (AV 4)
    22 May 1943 19 Dec 1943 FAW-10 Perth PBY-5 SoPac
    9 Sep 1943 FAW-10 Palm Island PBY-5 SoPac
    San Pablo (AVP 30)
    Half Moon (AVP 26)
    19 Nov 1943 * FAW-10 Port Moresby PBY-5 SoPac
    30 Dec 1943 * FAW-10 Palm Island PBY-5 SoPac
    10 Feb 1944 * FAW-10 Perth PBY-5 SoPac
    19 Jul 1944 * FAW-10 New Guinea PBY-5 SoPac
    19 Jul 1944 * FAW-10 Woendi PBY-5 SoPac
    23 Aug 1944 * FAW-10 Middlebg. Isl. PBY-5 SoPac
    18 Sep 1944 * FAW-10 Morotai PBY-5 SoPac
    San Pablo (AVP 30)
    Orca (AVP 49)
    14 Nov 1944 11 Dec 1944 FAW-10 Woendi PBY-5 SoPac
    • Continued combat deployment in the Pacific, moving from base to base.

     

    Wing Assignments

    Wing Tail Code Assignment Date
    PatWing-1 1 Oct 1937
    FAW-14 1 Apr 1943
    FAW-2 30 Apr 1943
    FAW-10 30 May 1943
    FAW-17 11 Sep 1943
    FAW-10 16 Feb 1944
    FAW-17 19 Jul 1944
    FAW-14 19 Dec 1944

     

    Unit Awards Received

    Unit Award Inclusive Date Covering Unit Award
    PUC 15 Sep 1943 1 Feb 1944

    Circa 1941 - 1942

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Prowling The Pacific Night - Harassing The Enemy With A PBY By Michael Martin - Squadron Mentioned: VP-11, VP-23, VPB-33, VPB-52, VP-101 and VP-102..." WebSite: Flight Journal http://www.flightjournal.com/articles/pacific_night/pacific_night.asp [04JAN2005]

    Shot down with impunity when the War began, the Navy's "slow but ugly" seaplane evolved into the deadly Black Cat—one of the most feared weapons in the Allied air arsenal.

    In the days prior to WW II, the Navy seaplanes known as Catalina Patrol Bombers (PBYs) were ridiculed in aviation circles for being both ugly and laughably slow. The first few months of the War did little to dispel the notion that if the plane wasn't exactly obsolete, it soon would be.

    The experience of Russell Enterline, an aviation radioman who served with VP-101 and VP-102 in the Philippines, was typical. Just after daybreak on December 10, 1941, while the Japanese attacked his base at Sangley Point, Philippines, Enterline watched a plane he had often flown in speed across the water as it tried desperately to get airborne.

    "Again, the pilot tried," recalled Enterline, "and this time, he succeeded in bringing the Catalina up ‘on the step,' and he lifted off. But I watched in absolute horror as a Japanese fighter picked up that plane from behind. Flying up the wake, its bullets strafed the water before ripping into the tail assembly. As the fighter pulled up, parts of the PBY's tail flew off. The plane seemed to hang still in flight for a second or two, but then it exploded and fell into the water in many burning parts."

    During the War's first few months, Japanese gunners and fighter pilots shot so many PBYs out of the sky that assignment to a PBY crew must have seemed a lot like a death sentence. For example, of the 28 seaplanes that were operating in the Philippines when fighting began, only three were still flying in the following spring.

    Ed Aeschliman was aboard a PBY that left Pearl Harbor on January 6, 1942, bound for the area just south of the Philippines. Nine days later, his plane was making its final approach for a landing at Ambon on the island of Ceram. "We had already started our landing approach when Japanese fighters peeled off from an incoming bomber and fighter attack and simply took us by surprise. I don't know how many fighters were involved, but I well remember the sound of bullets passing through the hull. It sounded like a tin can full of marbles was being shaken—only much louder. My first thought was ‘We sure didn't last long!'

    "Somehow we managed to get both waist guns and the forward turret gun firing by the time the Japanese came in for their second run. The net result of that effort was that an ammunition box was shot out of our turret gunner's hands while he was reloading. Still under attack, we hit the water and taxied as fast as we could for the protection of the trees and heavy foliage on the beach. After reaching shallow water, we left the plane and staggered ashore."

    When the raid was over, they returned to the plane to find it so badly shot up that there was nothing left to salvage. In truth, by early 1942, it appeared that there was little military advantage to salvage from any PBY.

    Yet by the War's end, crews flying these very same aircraft would sink several hundred thousand tons of enemy shipping, save countless lives and make an incalculable contribution to the Allied cause in the Pacific. How the ineffectual PBY evolved into the much-feared Black Cat is one of the least told stories of the entire War.



    Left: one of the roles the PBY played was rescuing downed U.S. pilots. Here, a Catalina crew rescues 2nd Lt. John J. Durkin (second from right) 20 days after he crash-landed in the swampland/jungle of the South Dutch New Guinea coast near Japanese-held territory. The beads came from admiring native women he met during his stay with the natives who found him. In the foreground (left to right): Lt. Malcolm Spontbergh, copilot; 1st Lt. Leslie Lange, pilot; Durkin and 1st Lt. Richard Osborne, navigator (Air Age archives).

    Right: the PBY could carry torpedoes and bombs as well as its defensive machine guns. Here, an Aleutian crewman prepares ordnance for an PBY mission (photo courtesy of Stan Piet).



    This aircraft has the early U.S. national markings with the red-dot center that were used prior to 1942. The wing-support pylon housed the flight engineer, and there was a window on each side of the pylon (photo courtesy of Warren Bodie).

    The metamorphosis of the Navy's "ugly duckling" can be attributed partly to a technological breakthrough and partly to simple black paint. But most of the credit must go to the resourceful, courageous young men (the average age of PBY pilots was 24) who pioneered aggressive ways to use their planes. In the process, they turned the PBY's more dubious qualities into deadly assets.

    The change began in early 1942 when a number of Catalinas were outfitted with a primitive form of radar. On the evening of June 3, 1942, four of them took off from Midway Island. After successfully locating the position of a huge Japanese fleet in the dark, they launched the first night torpedo attack in Naval history. Unfortunately, only one torpedo struck home, but it did severely damage the tanker, Akebono Maru.

    As daring as that attack was, it had little effect on the ensuing Battle of Midway; however, it did signal a significant change in the way seaplanes were used by the Navy. As Rear Adm. Raymond Spruance noted afterward, "Night torpedo attack, employing radar, represents one of the few profitable offensive uses of our patrol seaplanes."

    As it turned out, there were plenty of other offensive uses for the PBY, but most wouldn't be discovered until fighting in the Solomon Islands reached a critical stage. The Marine landing and takeover of the airfield at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, had been the first serious challenge to Japanese expansion in the Western Pacific. The enemy was absolutely determined to drive the Americans off the island, but as there were no nearby airfields where Japanese planes could fly cover for Japanese ships, Marine Corps aircraft based at Henderson Field controlled the seas around Guadalcanal during the day.

    After nightfall, it was a different story. Enemy ships steamed down New Georgia Sound (the "Slot") to offload troops and equipment and to shell Marine positions. With each side free to resupply its troops, a nasty stalemate developed; but it was a stalemate that the PBY played a big part in breaking after its pilots learned how to best operate that plane in the dark.

    Bill Barker, a crewman aboard a PBY in VP-11 recalled when things started to change. "Long routine patrols—boring to the point of frustration—marked September and early October. But about that time, VP-11 began an exciting new approach to fighting the War. Borrowing from the Japanese military's ‘Washing Machine Charlie' tactics, we initiated nuisance raids to hit targets of opportunity—armed and ready to attack with bombs and torpedoes. We began painting the bottom of the wings and hulls with a dull black paint."

    Before long, non-reflective black paint was standard on all Catalinas, and with the addition of exhaust-flame arrestors, the "ugly" Catalinas began to look downright sinister. More important, these "Black Cats" were all but invisible on dark nights. PBYs that went out to patrol at dusk usually carried four 500-pound bombs in addition to dozens of fragmentation bombs and illuminating flares. As they looked for enemy shipping, their slow speed was actually an advantage. After patrolling all night, the planes would return just before full daylight to minimize the chance of being ambushed by Japanese fighters.

    When a target was found, a PBY would swoop in from "up-moon" at masthead height—preferably along the ship's axis. Early on, it became apparent that enemy gunners either could not hear a Cat during its long, quiet approach, or they were holding their fire in the belief that they hadn't been detected. A few seconds after the bombs had been dropped (they were set to explode after a four- to five-second delay), a PBY crewmember would dump a bunch of high-powered flares out of the tunnel hatch. That brilliant, unexpected light blinded the Japanese antiaircraft gunners.

    PBY pilots soon realized that the traditional hazards associated with night flying could be used to their advantage. Depth perception at sea is tricky and particularly so in the dark—when the horizon isn't visible. Before WW II, the dangers of vertigo discouraged swift aerial maneuvers when visibility was marginal, but that wasn't a major concern for the Black Cats. Not only could the pilots "see" in the dark, but also the PBY altimeters were much more reliable than those installed in earlier models. Wes Hicks, a pilot with three patrol squadrons who also served as an instructor, had nothing but praise for the Cats' abilities. "Flying the PBY was one of the greatest pleasures of my life. Flying on one engine was a snap. You could do anything within reason with a PBY."

    If attacked by enemy fighters at night (or even during the day), Cat pilots headed directly for the ocean's surface. That maneuver made it impossible for attackers to get beneath them, and a fighter pilot who made a low-level pass would risk flying right into the sea. Russell Enterline's account of an attack three Zeros made on his plane a little later in the War illustrates the wisdom of that strategy.

    "One morning, as we returned from an all-night patrol, we were set upon by three Japanese fighters. The pilot said, ‘We'll fool those little bastards' and dropped the PBY about 1,000 feet in altitude to less than 100 feet; we then leveled off and pulled back on the throttles to slow it way down. One of the fighters made a run at us, but his high speed caused him to misjudge his trajectory, and he slipped into the water and exploded in a ball of flames. The other two apparently got the message because they took off for home."

    Tactics such as these were learned during the course of missions that lasted, on average, 11 hours (Cats could stay aloft for 20 hours and more). The weather in the Solomons was so atrocious that Cats sometimes returned from missions with portions of their fuselages stripped bare of paint by the force of the storms they had passed through.

    George Clute, a pilot in VP-11, got a sobering reminder of the weather's power one night off Guadalcanal. He had just made an unsuccessful skip-bombing run on a Japanese destroyer and was headed back for another try. "A downdraft caught us just as we entered a squallsquall, and that caused us to almost collide with the destroyer. We were below masthead height and so close we could see men on the bridge as we went by-even though it was near midnight and raining. Needless to say, I had nightmares about that one for awhile!"

    Despite all-night flights in miserable weather and confrontations that often left aircraft shot full of holes, the Catalinas almost always made it back to base. Naturally, PBY pilots and crews developed a lasting affection for an aircraft that seemed nearly indestructible. The feelings of Roger Elberg, a pilot with VP-23, were typical. "The PBY was some kind of aircraft, especially for the men who flew them. You got to the point, somewhere along the way, where you felt it could do anythiIJ.g you asked of it.

    "When we first arrived overseas, I flew with a pilot named Pierre La Ponte. He had been in the Navy for a long time. One of his claims was that he could make a 180-degree turn in the length of a PBY. He would put the Cat in a little dive, jam the rudder,. wrack the plane up and almost roll it on its back. Flying with fellows like him, and others I met along the way, helped me gain the confidence to trust the PBY. So when I trusted it-and asked the impossible-the old Pratt & Whitney engines just kept right on singing, and the Catalina always brought us home."

    During night naval battles in the Slot, PBYs patrolled the gaps between the islands to prevent enemy subs from making "end around" attacks on Allied ships. From there, recalled pilot George Poulos, they had a ringside seat for some unforgettable sights.

    "Witnessing a night fleet battle in the Slot was an awesome experience. A typical event would be a calm, quiet night, then a searchlight would flash for a brief second, and all hell would break loose. The intensity of fire from both sides was unbelievable. Giant explosions could be seen aboard the ships of both sides. In one instance, I witnessed a ship, later identified as one of our cruisers, suffer a direct magazine hit and blow up; it had a fireball that climbed to at least 10,000 feet."

    On an early morning patrol just prior to the Battle of Santa Cruz, Poulos and his crew located a powerful enemy force of four carriers and their escorts. After radioing the enemy's position back to base, they were attacked by Japanese Zeros. Nine times before, Allied planes had sighted carrier forces, and Poulos was well aware that all nine times the Japanese had immediately shot them down. Determined not to be the tenth, Poulos dived toward the ocean.

    "There was very little wind at sea, with no discernible whitecaps; instead, there were huge swells that rose 15 to 20 feet. By the time the first Zero was making a firing run on us, I was at the bottom of a trough looking up at water on both sides. As a swell terminated, I picked up either the port or starboard wing and slid into the next trough. As a Zero came in on a firing run, I turned quickly into his line of flight to shorten his run. He tightened his turn as much as he dared, flying ever so close to the water. The Zero attack was totally ineffective. The closest they came was to splatter bullets 20 to 30 yards behind us. Apparently sensing their ineffectiveness, and having no desire to be drawn miles away from their fleet, they broke off and left us."

    As time went on, Catalina patrols got better at denying the enemy nighttime use of the waters in the Solomons. To thwart PBY radar, the Japanese used coast-hugging barges, but the Cats still found enough of them to severely restrict resupply efforts. Often, the mere sound of a PBY overhead in the dark would be enough to cause re-supply ships to turn back. In February 1943, the Japanese conceded the futility of the efforts and evacuated Guadalcanal. Momentum in the Solomons (and in the entire Pacific) shifted, as the Allies now began to work their way up the island chain and on toward Japan.

    A few months later, Catalinas operating in the vicinity of New Guinea began to rack up a series of stunning successes. The early morning hours of October 24, 1943, for example, found the crew of the PBY Rlack Magic braving intense antiaircraft fire off New Britain as they dropped a 500-pound bomb on the destroyer Mochizuki. Ablaze from amidships to stern, the Mochizuki eventually sank.

    Meanwhile, during the month of December, VPB-52 sank or damaged two cruisers, three destroyers, two submarines and 76,000 tons of merchant shipping. Impressive as those numbers were, they would be far surpassed-but not before a legendary raid by Lt. Bob Dilworth and his Black Cat crew.

    On the night of February 11, 1944, Dilworth was approaching the large air base at Wewak on Japanese-held New Guinea. He had been using rainsqualls as cover on his approach to the field, but as he dropped down out of the clouds, he found himself in the middle of a group of enemy fighters with their lights on. By sheer coincidence, he had blundered into a Japanese landing formation. One of the enemy pilots, possibly annoyed at being cut off, pulled alongside and flashed his lights at the darkened PBY (he was so close that Dilworth's waist gunner could read his instrument panel).

    Keeping his cool, Dilworth acted as if he belonged until the unlikely formation neared touchdown. At that point, he veered off toward a cargo ship that was anchored at the end of the runway. Before the Japanese could react, he sank that ship with two bombs, demolished the Wewak lighthouse with another and, for good measure, strafed the shore facilities before departing the scene.

    Dilworth's poise under pressure was characteristic of the best PBY crews. As the War moved into the Coral and Bismarck Seas, the crews became extremely proficient at their jobs. VPB-33 may have been the best of them all.

    With enemy activity increasing greatly in the weeks before Gen. Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines, VPB-33 came on station on Sept 1, 1944. Operating from a seaplane tender off Middleburg Island, they sank nine ships during their first four nights of duty and damaged several others, including a destroyer.

    On September 23, Lt. William "Wild Bill" Sumter set some sort of accuracy record by sinking two destroyer escorts and a seaplane tender on a single bombing run. By the end of the month, Sumter and his crew had sunk 13 ships. During their 5-week tour, the Cats of VPB-33 destroyed 43 enemy ships and severely damaged 20 more. They sank or damaged 157,000 tons of enemy shipping. In a note of gratitude, Gen. MacArthur noted, "No command in the War has exceeded the brilliance of their operations."

    The end of the Philippines Campaign coincided with the end of most Black Cat offensive operations. By then, there just wasn't much enemy shipping left to attack. PBY crews continued to run "Dumbo missions" to rescue Allied fliers and sailors.

    Tex Foret of VP-11 recounted a notable rescue after a destroyer went down. "There were a lot of men in the water, and a Catalina from the squadron next to us-I think it was VP-34-was coming back from a long hop when they saw the tin can going down. All those fellows were in the water with no help in sight. They landed the PBY and loaded 114 or 115 men inside the plane, on the struts, on the turtleback, on top of the wing and everywhere they could hold on. Then they simply taxied until they contacted an American ship, which promptly took the survivors off their hands. This old Catalina, bless its soul, was able to snatch more than 100 sailors out of the water and hang on to them until help arrived."

    Foret's affection for the PBY was shared by virtually everyone who flew in or had their lives saved by that "ugly" but reliable aircraft. George Poulos spoke for all of them when he summed up his wartime experiences. "I knew that my PBY service was, without a doubt, one of the highlights of my aviation career and one I would always fondly remember. A great experience with a great airplane."


    Circa 1941

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMMITTEE ON PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, HEARINGS: EXHIBITS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, Pt. 16, pp. 2721-27..." WebSite: ibiblio Public Library http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/martin_1.html [16JAN2006]

    From: U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMMITTEE ON Pearl Harbor ATTACK, HEARINGS: 
    EXHIBITS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, Pt. 16, pp. 2721-27.
    
    
                                 EXHIBIT NO. 120
    
    [1]          KIMMEL EXHIBIT 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION
    
                                                PATROL WING TWO
                                            U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
                                     Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.
    
    Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
    
    MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am 
    forwarding to you the following information:
    
    1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 
    December, 1941:
                                Total
    Squadron  In commission   available  Location   Under  Ready   In air
                              for flight            Repair at base
    VP-11     12 PBY-5            12     Kaneohe      0      12         0
    VP-12     12 PBY-5            11     Kaneohe      1      11         0
    VP-14     12 PBY-5        [1] 10     Kaneohe      2       7     [1] 3
    VP-21     12 PBY-3        [2] 11     Midway       1       4     [2] 7
    VP-21      1 PBY-3 (spare)     1     Pearl Harbor 1       0         0
    VP-21      1 PBY-3            12     Pearl Harbor 2      12         0
    VP-22     14 PBY-3            12     Pearl Harbor 1      11         0
    VP-24      6 PBY-5             5     Pearl Harbor 1       1     [3] 4
    
    RECAPITULATION
    
                                Total
    Squadron  In commission   available  Under  Ready   In air
                              for flight Repair at base
    
    At Kaneohe     36          [1] 33       3       30     [1] 3
    At Pearl       33          [3] 28       5       24     [3] 4
    At Midway      12          [2] 11       1        4     [2] 7 
       Total       81              72       9       58        14
    
    [2]                               NOTES
    
    [1] 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of 
    assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet 
    Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan (9—1). 3 
    planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).
    
    [2] 5 planes conducting search of sector 120 —170  radius 450 miles; 
    departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to 
    rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130  
    from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes 
    additional plants armed with 2—500 pound bombs each were on the alert at 
    Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about
    2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
    searched sector 060  to 100  radius 400 miles. One plane was under 
    repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at 
    Pearl Harbor.
    
    [3] Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. 
    Submarine.
    
    [4] All planes except those under repair were armed with machine guns 
    and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.
    
    [3]  2. Material condition:
    
    (a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-
    3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried 
    to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:
    
    Squadron Number Arrival date   Squadron Number Arrival date
             Planes                         Planes
    VP-11      12   28 Oct. 1941    VP-23     12    23 Nov. 1941
    VP-24       6   28 Oct. 1941    VP-14     12    23 Nov. 1941.
    VP-12      12    8 Nov. 1941
    
    (b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down 
    difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete 
    absence of spare parts. In additions a program for installation of 
    leakproof tanks, armor, and modified
    
    engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war 
    until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous 
    operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.
    
    (c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from
    Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake 
    since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material 
    condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with 
    inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of 
    its planes were [4] approaching 18 months service and were due for 
    overhaul.
    
    (d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol 
    squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches 
    impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to 
    experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of 
    commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron 
    TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and 
    maintenance.
    
    (e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive 
    expansion training operations and improvement of the material military 
    effectiveness at the same time preserving the maximum practicable 
    availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material 
    and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane 
    operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic 
    attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately 
    available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which 
    there were no replacements.
    
    (f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient 
    patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the Job required. 
    For the commander of a search group to be able to state with  [5]  some 
    assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and 
    launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective 
    daily search through 360  to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming 
    a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight 
    of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare 
    parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such 
    operations.
    
                                                 (Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER
                                                 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
                                                 Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
    
    PW2/A16-3/
    016
    Confidential

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Hearings Before The Joint Committee On The Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress Of The United States - Seventy-Ninth Congress...Squadrons mentioned: VP-11, VP-13, VP-14, VP-21, VP-22, VP-23, VP-24, VP-31, VP-32, VP-41, VP-42, VP-43, VP-44, VP-51, VP-52, VP-71, VP-72, VP-73, VP-74, VP-81, VP-82, VP-83, VP-84, VP-91, VP-92, VP-93, VP-94, VP-101, VP-102, CPW-1, CPW-2, CPW-3, CPW-4, CPW-5, CPW-7, CPW-8 and CPW-9..." WebSite: The public's library and digital archive http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html [01APR2005]
    Get Adobe Reader
    Open VP History Adobe FileHearings Before The Joint Committee On the Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack 333KB

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: NAS History ThumbnailCameraNAS Kaneohe History "...Lost Shipmates (VP-11, VP-12, and VP-14) Photo #: NH 100928 - Naval Air Station Kanoehe Bay, Oahu, Hawaii - Memorial to the eighteen Navy men and one civilian killed in the 7 December 1941 Japanese air attack on NAS Kanoehe Bay. Naval personnel who lost their lives were members of the station crew and of Patrol Squadrons 11, 12 and 14. The monument was erected at Marine Corps Air Station Kanoehe Bay in December 1981. Photographed 4 May 1986 by H.E.("Ed") Coffer. Donation of H.E. Coffer, 1986. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph." NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-u/r-uhlman.htm [30MAY2003]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...PATROL SQUADRON ELEVEN - U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION - Pearl Harbor, T.H. - 20 Dec 1941..." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Pearl/PatRon11.html [08JAN2001]

    From: The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
    To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

    Subject: December 7, 1941 air raid; report of.

    Reference: CinC Pac. confidential despatch 102102 of December, 1941.

    In compliance with reference (a) the following report is submitted.
    Disposition of planes before attack:

  • 2 planes in hangar.
  • 4 planes at south end of hangar.
  • 6 planes on ramp.

    Personnel present at start of raid:
  • Duty section and some personnel who had arrived early to take over ready duty.

    Offensive action taken:
  • Three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns were manned in a plane being removed from hangar shortly after the raid started. The machine gun positions in the plane were soon abandoned, the guns being moved to a safer position with as much ammunition as the men could get. A machine gun nest of 4 guns, 1 Browning Automatic rifle, and one Lewis gun was set up in a grove of scrub trees near the south end of the hangar and another nest of two guns was set up in a semi-protected spot hear the south end of the hangar.

    Damage to enemy
  • From four to six planes were seen to be either smoking or spraying gasoline, one plane crashed and another was thought to crash.

    Damage sustained:
  • 7 planes were burned.
  • 1 plane was wrecked by gun and bombs beyond repair.
  • 4 planes were damaged but left in a repairable state.
  • Practically all hangar and office equipment and stores were destroyed. All service records except one, all personnel flight logs, propeller logs, engine logs, plane logs and the master flight logs were saved.

    Under continuous attacks by the enemy, machine gun and rifle crews manned their guns and all other personnel worked to disperse planes and to save material.

    The following personnel lost their lives or were severely wounded in courageous performance of duty.

    FOSS, Rodney Shelton, D-V(G), USNR. Deceased
    SMARTT, Joseph Gillespie, A-V(N), USNR. Deceased
    FORMOE, Clarence Melvin, 414 20 46, AMM1c, USNR. Deceased
    MANNING, Milburn Alexander, 337 12 54, AMM3c, USN. Deceased
    WEAVER, Luther Dayton, 381 35 39, Sea1c, USN. Deceased
    BUCKLEY, John Daniel, 201 81 68, AOM3c, USN. Deceased
    ROBINSON, James Henry, 372 29 81, Sea2c, USN. Deceased
    NASH, Kenton (none), 368 36 41, Y1c, USN. Seriously Injured
    BYRON, Harry George, 114 95 60, ACMM(PA), USN. Seriously Injured
    CROWNOVER, Joseph Talley, 268 25 28, RM1c, USN. Seriously Injured


    [signed]
    F.R. JONES,
    Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
    Acting Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.

    COPIES TO:
    COMSCOFOR
    COMAIRSCOFOR

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "07DEC41--Patrol Wing TWO (CPW-2), U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. T.H., War Diary Sunday, December 7, 1941...Prior to the sudden attack by Japanese aircraft on Oahu, the forces under the Commander Patrol Wing TWO were disposed as follows: VP-21 at Midway; VP-11, VP-12, and VP-14 at Kaneohe; VP-22, VP-23, and VP-24 at Pearl Harbor. All tenders except the WRIGHT were at Pearl Harbor, the WRIGHT was enroute Pearl from Midway. Following is the exact status of aircraft at the time of attack:

    VP-21 7 planes in air conducting search 120 to 170 degrees to 450 miles from Midway. 4 planes on surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice.

    VP-11 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice

    VP-12 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-14 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges. 3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-22 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-23 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-24 4 planes in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines. 1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

    Total 72 in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less..." http://www.pby.com[14MAY2000]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "00DEC41--Order of Battle December 1941 Patrol Wing One - NAS Kaneohe Bay, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,=20 =20 VP-11 - 12 Catalinas PBY5, VP-12 - 12 Catalinas PBY5, VP-14 - 12 Calalinas PBY5..." http://www.halisp.net/listserv/pacwar/1314.html

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "07DEC41--On 7 Dec 41, NAS Kaneohe Bay, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was the home of the three squadrons of Patrol Wing One (PatWing One). Each of the three squadrons operated 12 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalina seaplanes. The three squadrons and their aircraft status were: Patrol Squadron Eleven (VP-11): All 12 PBY-5's could be made ready for operations on four hours notice...Patrol Squadron Twelve (VP-12) 6 PBY-5's were ready for operations on 10 minutes notice5 PBY-5's could be ready for operations on four hours notice 1 PBY-5 was under repair...Patrol Squadron Fourteen (VP-14) 3 PBY-5's were in the air on patrol 3 PBY-5's were ready for operations on 10 minutes notice 4 PBY-5's could be ready for operations on four hours notice 2 PBY-5's were under repair..." World War II Discussion List WWII-L@UBVM.BITNET http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9312A&L=wwii-l&D=&H=&T=&O=&F=&P=4270

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...PATROL WING TWO - U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION - Pearl Harbor, T.H. - 20 Dec 1941..." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Pearl/PatWing2.html [08JAN2001]

    UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIRCRAFT
    PATROL WING TWO
    FLEET AIR DETACHMENT
    MCAS/NAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii
    1 January 1942.


    From: The Commander Task Force NINE (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
    To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

    Subject: Operations on December 7, 1941.

    On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, forces under my command were disposed as follows: Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE at Midway, Patrol Squadrons ELEVEN, TWELVE, FOURTEEN at Kaneohe, TWENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE and TWENTY-FOUR at Pearl Harbor, all tenders except Wright at Pearl Harbor; Wright enroute to Pearl Harbor from Midway.

    The condition of readiness in force was Baker 5 (50% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. In addition to the above, three squadrons (VP-21 at Midway, VP-23 at Pearl, and VP-11 at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice). This was augmented by specific duty assignments on December 7 which required six planes from Patrol Squadrons FOURTEEN, TWENTY-FOUR, and TWELVE to be ready for light on 30 minutes notice.

    The general orders listed above were modified by circumstances and planes actually ready for flight were as follows:

    VP-21 7 planes - in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from Midway.
  • 4 planes - on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice.

    VP-11 12 planes - ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-12 6 planes - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 5 planes - ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-14 3 planes - in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges.
  • 3 planes - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
  • 4 planes - ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-22 12 planes - ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-23 11 planes - ready for flight on 4 hours notice.

    VP-24 4 planes - in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines.
  • 1 plane - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

    Total 72 planes - in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less.

    In this connection it may be stated that the 4 hours notice was primarily set to permit rest and recreation of personnel and was in no wise a criterion of material readiness. For example, one plane of VP-23, theoretically on 4 hours notice, was actually in the air 45 minutes after the first bomb dropped.

    To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped, aircraft of this command were in the following condition:
  • 14 - in the air (7 on a search from Midway).
  • 58 - on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less.
  • 9 - undergoing repairs.
  • 81 - Total.

    Illustrative of the efforts made by personnel, one of the nine planes undergoing repairs took off for a search at 1356, local time, loaded with 4 one thousand pound bombs.

    A narrative of events of the day follows:
  • TIME (LOT)
  • 0700 14-P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.
  • 0715 Message coded and transmitted to base.
  • 0735 Message and decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer.
  • 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer.
  • 0740 Relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief.
  • 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer.
  • 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar.
  • 0758 Message ordered broadcasted to all ships present quote "AIR RAID Pearl Harbor X THIS IS NO DRILL" unquote (An identical message was sent by CinCPac).
  • 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone (Received by some of the planes in the air at 0805).

    From this time on an accurate chronological account is impracticable.

    The Commander Patrol Wing TWO arrived at the Operations Office during the first attack and approved the orders that had been issued. Telephonic communication with the various squadrons at Pearl Harbor was established in order to supplement and possibly accelerate the radio transmissions. As was usually the case, it was difficult to communicate with Kaneohe. The page printer had gone out of commission and it was quite difficult to obtain a telephonic connection. Immediately upon termination of the first attack, an endeavor was made to determine the sectors of the search actually being covered. it was determined, with some difficulty that, of all planes at the bases of Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, only 3 were still in commission. These were dispatched to fill holidays in what appeared to be the most promising sectors for search. in addition, available planes from the Utility Wing were ordered out. The 2 planes still available for duty at Kaneohe were ordered by telephone to cover the sector between 280 and 300 degrees. The one plane still available at Pearl Harbor had some difficulty in being launched due to the wreckage and fires of other planes in the way. Abut this time the second attack came in. Fire was opened by tenders of this command and from machine guns mounted in planes on the ground or removed from the planes to extemporized mountings with greater arcs of fire. As a result of this second attack, all communications, radio, telephone and page printer were knocked out of commission. Immediate steps to restore communications were taken while the second attack was still underway and communications personnel, who unfortunately have not yet been identified, proceeded to repair the radio antenna during the height of the attack. Before the end of the second attack, radio communications were established on the tenders of this command. Shortly thereafter, telephonic communication was reestablished and information was received that the 2 planes at Kaneohe previously reported as ready for service had been destroyed. Accordingly, orders were issued for the 1 plane at Pearl Harbor, which had somehow escaped uninjured during the second attack, to cover the sector from 280 to 300 degrees. The Commander Patrol Wing ONE at Kaneohe felt that the orders to cover the sector 280 to 300, which had been transmitted to him by telephone for the 2 planes on the ground, required his taking action and he accordingly diverted 14-P-1 and 14-P-3 from the sectors that they had been searching. Information of this action was not received by me.

    The Fleet Aviation Officer, Captain A.C. Davis, U.S.N., kept in constant touch by telephone and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of my staff maintained communications with Army information centers and requested that attempts be made to track the retiring Japanese planes by RADAR. Unfortunately, the Curtiss RADAR was placed out of commission by the damage sustained by that vessel. During the mid-afternoon, 14-P-2 reported being attacked by enemy planes and was thereafter not heard from for 2 or 3 hours. As it was felt that this plane had been shot down and a hole thus left in what appeared to be the most promising sector of the search, every effort was made, as additional planes from whatever source became available, to plug the gap.

    All hands exerted their utmost efforts to get more planes ready for flight and to arm them for offensive action. Three more patrol planes were reported ready at Pearl Harbor and dispatched, each carrying 4 one thousand pound bombs. Thirteen SBD planes, loaded with 500 pound bombs, came in from Lexington and were pressed into service. Nine were dispatched to search a sector to the north, while the remaining 4 were ordered to attack 4 Japanese troop ships reported off Barbers point. This report proved to be unfounded.

    The accompanying charts indicate the search as actually conducted. The urgent necessity for conducting daily searches since December 7 and for putting all planes possible back in commission, together with urgency for immediate operations, have precluded an exhaustive analysis of the events of the day. Certain highlights however may be of interest:

    All planes in commission had guns on board together with full allowances of service ammunition. During the first attack, fire was opened from the guns as mounted in the planes, and when it was discovered that these were not effective for fire from the ground due to structural interference, many personnel removed these guns from the planes and set them upon benches in vises and opened up an effective fire against the second attack. As nearly as can be determined, a total of 4 Japanese planes were shot down by personnel of patrol plane squadrons by this method.

    Two planes or Utility Squadron One conducted an extensive search although these planes being of a non-combatant type were not equipped with machine guns. Despite the lack of defense against attacks by hostile aircraft, the pilots of these planes persisted in their search until the threatened exhaustion of their fuel forced their return to Pearl Harbor. The devotion to duty of these pilots will be made the subject of a special report.

    These and numerous other instances of distinguished conduct occurred which Commander Task Force NINE has not yet had time to investigate.

    Attention is invited to the following dispatches and mailgrams indicating the extensive searches conducted by units of this command during the period 30 November to 7 December, 1941, from Wake and Midway:

    CinCPac 280450
    280447 of November.
    040237 of December.

    ComTaskForce NINE 291124
  • 292101
  • 292103 of November.
  • 302359
  • 050323 of December.

    [signed] P.N.L. BELLINGER.

    Copy to: Comairscofor.

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: Logo Thumbnail [18MAR2000]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Patrol Squadron ELEVEN Report for Pearl Harbor Attack..." WebSite: Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/ph13.htm [19DEC2005]

    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
    805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
    WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060

    Patrol Squadron ELEVEN Report for Pearl Harbor Attack

      PATROL SQUADRON ELEVEN
    U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION
    KANEOHE BAY, T.H.
    VP11
    (0200)
       

    From: The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.  
    To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.  
       
    Subject: December 7, 1941 air raid; report of.
       
    Reference: CinC Pac. confidential despatch 102102 of December, 1941.

    1. In compliance with reference (a) the following report is submitted.
      1. Disposition of planes before attack:

        2 planes in hangar.
        4 planes at south end of hangar.
        6 planes on ramp.

      2. Personnel present at start of raid:

        Duty section and some personnel who had arrived early to take over ready duty.

      3. Offensive action taken:

        Three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns were manned in a plane being removed from hangar shortly after the raid started. The machine gun positions in the plane were soon abandoned, the guns being moved to a safer position with as much ammunition as the men could get. A machine gun nest of 4 guns, 1 Browning Automatic rifle, and one Lewis gun was set up in a grove of scrub trees near the south end of the hangar and another nest of two guns was set up in a semi-protected spot hear the south end of the hangar.

      4. Damage to enemy

        From four to six planes were seen to be either smoking or spraying gasoline, one plane crashed and another was thought to crash.

      5. Damage sustained:

        7 planes were burned.
        1 plane was wrecked by gun and bombs beyond repair.
        4 planes were damaged but left in a repairable state.

        Practically all hangar and office equipment and stores were destroyed. All service records except one, all personnel flight logs, propeller logs, engine logs, plane logs and the master flight logs were saved.

      6. Under continuous attacks by the enemy, machine gun and rifle crews manned their guns and all other personnel worked to disperse planes and to save material.
      7. The following personnel lost their lives or were severely wounded in courageous performance of duty.

        FOSS, Rodney Shelton, D-V(G), USNR. Deceased
        SMARTT, Joseph Gillespie, A-V(N), USNR.       "
        FORMOE, Clarence Melvin, 414 20 46, AMM1c, USNR.       "
        MANNING, Milburn Alexander, 337 12 54, AMM3c, USN.       "
        WEAVER, Luther Dayton, 381 35 39, Sea1c, USN.       "
        BUCKLEY, John Daniel, 201 81 68, AOM3c, USN.       "
        ROBINSON, James Henry, 372 29 81, Sea2c, USN.       "
        NASH, Kenton (none), 368 36 41, Y1c, USN. Seriously Injured
        BYRON, Harry George, 114 95 60, ACMM(PA), USN.       "              "
        CROWNOVER, Joseph Talley, 268 25 28, RM1c, USN.       "              "

    [signed]
    F.R. JONES,
    Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
    Acting Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.

    COPIES TO:

      COMSCOFOR
      COMAIRSCOFOR


    Source: Enclosure (E) to CINCPAC action report Serial 0479 of 15 February 1942, World War II action reports,
    the Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740.15 May 2001

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...By Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/18/96 Updated: 12/19/96..." http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html [23AUG2005]

    Page i
    
    HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO PART 33 PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY (Pages 926-985, Exhibit 4, "Rainbow 5") Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946
    [i] SECRET EXHIBIT No. 4 NAVY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, Washington, May 26, 1941. Op-12B-5-McC (SC)A16(R-5) Serial 060512 From: The Chief of Naval Operations. To: Distribution List for WPL-46. Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46). Enclosures: (A) Pages for WPL 46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages. (B) Receipt form in duplicate. 1. Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith. 2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B). 3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL-46. 4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL 46 are completed. 5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan. Page 927 6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan- Rainbow No. 5 cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning," and in the "Registered Publication Manual". 7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL-8. [ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual". 9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDINATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION. H. R. STARK. [iii] Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Change Subject Matter Page or Sheet No. in Effect Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)A16(R-5) of May 26, 1941. .. i, ii Original List of Effective Pages ................... iii Original Table of Corrections ...................... iv Original Distribution List ......................... v, vi Original Title Page ................................ 1 Original Table of Contents ......................... 2 to 4 inc. Original Introduction .............................. 5 to 8 inc. Original Part I .................................... 9, 10 Original Chart .................................... 11 Original Part I (Cont'd) ........................... 12 Original Part II ................................... 13, 14 Original Part III .................................. 15 to 60 inc. Original Part IV ................................... 61 to 80 inc. Original Part V .................................... 81, 82 Original Appendix I ................................ 1 to 51 inc. Original Appendix II Title Page ............................... 1 Original Chapter I ................................ 2, 3 Original Chapter II ............................... 4, 5 Original Table ATF-1 ............................. 1 to 3 inc. Original Chapter III .............................. 6 Original Table PAF-1 ............................. 1 to 3 inc. Original Table PAF-2 ............................. 1 Original Chapter IV: Table SEP-1 ............................. 1 Original Chapter V: Table ASF-1 ............................. 1, 2 Original Chapter VI ............................... 7 Original Table NE-1 .............................. 1 Original Table NE-2 .............................. 1 Original Chapter VII: Table CNO-1 ............................. 1 _ Original Chapter VIII ............................. 8 to 10 inc. Original Table NACF .............................. 1 to 5 inc. Original Table SCF ............................... 1 to 4 inc. Original Table CACF .............................. 1 Original Table PACF .............................. 1 Original Table PSCF .............................. 1 to 3 inc. Original Table PNCF .............................. 1 Original Table HCF ............................... 1 Original Table PhCF .............................. 1 Original Chapter IX ............................... 11 Original [iv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS R. P. M. or Change No. Date of Signature and rank of officer entering entry change. 1 26-7-44 Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R. Page 928 NAVY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, Washington, June 3, 1941. Op-12B-5-McC (SC)A16(R-5) Serial 064112 Secret From: The Chief of Naval Operations. To: The Distribution List for WPL-46. Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46. 1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46: (a) On Page 45 Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line-Change 13,400 to 6,400. Paragraph 3511.a.2.(g), first line-Change 23,600 to 12,600. Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line-Change 44,000 to 23,000. (b) On Page 80 Paragraph 4601, first line,-after "will be" insert "prepared as". (c) On Page 30 of Appendix I Paragraph 51.a.(13), first line-Change 13,400 to 6,400. Paragraph 51.a.(14), first line Change 23,600 to 12,600. (d) On Page 31 of Appendix I Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line-Change 44,000 to 23,000. 2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46. 3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States. R. E. INGERSOLL, Acting. DISTRIBUTION LIST [V] Official to whom issued Registered Nos. Commander in Chief. U.S. Pacific Fleet 1 Commander, Battle Force 2 Commander, Battleships, Battle Force 3 Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld) 4 Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld) 5 Commander, Battleship Division Three 6 Commander, Battleship Division Five 7 Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force 8 Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force 9 Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force 10 Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force 11 Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force 12 Commander, Scouting Force 13 Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force 14 Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force 15 Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force 16 Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet 17 Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 18 Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet 19 Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet 20 Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet 21 Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 22 Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet 23 Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet 24 Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet 25 Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 26 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division 27 Commanding General, Second Marine Division 28 Operations-Director, War Plans Division 29, 30, 31 -Director, Naval Intelligence Division 32 -Director, Naval Communications Division 33 -Director, Fleet Maintenance Division 34 -Director, Ship Movements Division 35 -Director, Naval Districts Division 36 -Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements Division) 37 Chief of Bureau of Navigation 38, 39 Chief of Bureau of Ordnance 40 Chief of Bureau of Ships 41 Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks 42 Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics 43 Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 44, 45 Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 46 [VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy 47 Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps 48 Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 49 Page 929 DISTRIBUTION LIST-Continued Official to whom issued Registered nos. War Plans Division General Staff, War Department 50 President, Naval War College 51 Commandant, First Naval District 52, 53 Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 54 Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H. 55 Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I 56 Commandant, Third Naval District 57, 58 Commandant, Fourth Naval District 59, 60 Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61, 62 Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 63 Commandant, Sixth Naval District 64, 65 Commandant, Seventh Naval District 66 Commandant, Eighth Naval District 67, 68 Commandant, Ninth Naval District 69 Commandant, Tenth Naval District 70 Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 71 Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad 72 Commandant, Eleventh Naval District 73, 74 Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 75, 76 Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District 77, 78 Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 79 Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 80 Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District 81 Commanding General, Department of Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps, San Francisco, California 82 Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. 83 Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. 84 Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa 85 United States Military Mission in London 86, 87 United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada 88 British Military Mission in Washington 89 U. S. Naval Attache, Melbourne, Australia 90 Registered Publication Section,-Working Copy 91 Registered Publication Section,-Library Copy 92 Registered Publication Section,-Reserve Copies 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 Op-12B-McC NAVY DEPARTMENT, (SC)A16(R-5) OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, Serial 071912 Washington, July 1, 1941. Secret From: The Chief of Naval Operations. To: The Distribution List for WPL-46. Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers. Reference: (a) GO No. 142. (b) GO No. 143. (c) WPL-46. 1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established. 2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, Appendix I, WPL-46. 3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended. 4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense. 5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated: Commandant, 3rd Naval District-Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier; Commandant, 6th Naval District-Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier; Commandant, 10th Naval District-Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier; Commandant, 15th Naval District-Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier; Page 930 Commandant, 12th Naval District-Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Frontier; Commandant, 13th Naval District-Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Frontier; Commandant, 14th Naval District-Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier; Commandant, 16th Naval District-Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier; 6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of the Naval Coastal Frontiers remain in a SECRET classification. Correspondence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature. 7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized. /s/ H. R. STARK. [1] W. P. L.-46 NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN-RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES NAVY [2] TABLE OF CONTENTS Subject Page [1] Introduction: Chapter I. Origin, Basis, and Scope of this Plan ................... 5 Chapter II. Execution of this Plan ................................. 6 Section I. Execution of the Entire Plan ........................... 6 Section 2. Execution of a part of this Plan ....................... 7 Chapter III. Agreements with Associated Powers other than the British Commonwealth .............................................. 8 Part I. Task Organization, Information and Assumptions: Chapter I. Task Organization ...................................... 9 Chart Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers ............ 11 Chapter II. Information and Assumptions ........................... 12 Part II. Outline of Tasks: Chapter I. Concept of the War ..................................... 13 Chapter II. The General Task ...................................... 14 Part III. Assignment of Tasks: Chapter I. Forces in the Western Atlantic Area .................... 15 Section 1. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet .............................. 15 Section 2. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces ..................... 21 Section 3. Command Relations ..................................... 25 Chapter II. Forces in the Pacific Area ............................ 27 Section 1. The U. S. Pacific Fleet ............................... 27 Section 2. The Southeast Pacific Force ........................... 31 Section 3. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces ..................... 33 Section 4. Command Relations ..................................... 36 Chapter III. Forces in the Far East Area .......................... 38 Section 1. The U. S Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier ................................................ 38 Chapter IV. Forces in the United Kingdom and British Home Waters Area ...................................................... 42 Section 1. The U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe .................. 42 Chapter V. The Services ........................................... 44 Section 1. The Naval Transportation Service ...................... 44 Section 2. The Naval Communication Service ....................... 47 Section 3. The Naval Intelligence Service ........................ 48 Chapter VI. The Shore Establishment ............................... 49 Chapter VII. Instructions Jointly Applicable to Task Forces ....... 50 Section 1. Forming the Task Forces ............................... 50 Section 2. Mobilization .......................................... 51 [3] Section 3. The Routing and Protection of Shipping .............. 53 Section 4. Rules of Warfare ...................................... 58 Section 5. Intelligence Liaison between Commanders of Associated Forces in the Field .................................. 60 Part IV. Logistics: Chapter I. The Shore Establishment ................................ 61 Chapter II. General Directives .................................... 62 Section 1. Personnel ............................................. 62 Section 2. Material .............................................. 63 Section 3. Transportation ........................................ 64 Section 4. Legal Services ........................................ 66 Section 5. Augmentation and Maintenance of the Shore Establishment ............................................. 67 Section 6. Priorities ............................................ 68 Chapter III. The Operating Forces and Services .................... 69 Section 1. Preparation for War Service ........................... 69 Section 2. Maintenance ........................................... 73 Section 3. Augmentation .......................................... 77 Chapter IV. Advanced Bases ........................................ 78 Chapter V. Salvage ................................................ 79 Chapter VI. Plans to be prepared by the Shore Establishment ....... 80 Part V. Special Provisions: Chapter I. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure ............ 81 Chapter II. Joint Plans Covering Intelligence Service, Censorship and Publicity, and Mobilization of Resources .......... 82 [1] Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit. Page 931 APPENDICES Subject Page [1] Appendix I. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 .. 1-36 Annex I. Coastal Frontiers ...................................... 37-51 [4] Appendix II. The Composition of Forces Title Page ........................................................ 1 Chapter I. Introduction ........................................... 2 Chapter II. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet .............................. 4 Table ATF-1 .............................................. Sheets 1 to Chapter III. The U. S. Pacific Fleet .............................. 6 Table PAF-1 ............................................ Sheets 1 to 3 Table PAF-2 .................................................. Sheet 1 Chapter IV. The Southeast Pacific Force Table SEP-1 .................................................. Sheet 1 Chapter V. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet Table ASF-1 .............................................. Sheets 1, 2 Chapter VI. U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe ...................... 7 Table NE-1 ................................................... Sheet 1 Table NE-2 ................................................... Sheet 1 Chapter VII. Vessels Operating under the Chief of Naval Operations Table CNO-1 .................................................. Sheet 1 Chapter VIII. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces ....................... 8 Table NACF ............................................. Sheets 1 to 5 Table SCF .............................................. Sheets 1 to 4 Table CACF ................................................... Sheet 1 Table PACF ................................................... Sheet 1 Table PSCF ............................................. Sheets 1 to 3 Table PNCF ................................................... Sheet 1 Table HCF .................................................... Sheet 1 Table PhCF ................................................... Sheet 1 Chapter IX. Naval Transportation Service .......................... 11 [5] INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN 0101. This Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. 0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5. 0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5, which is included in this plan as Appendix I. 0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War. 0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations." [6] CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN 0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV dispatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5". b. The date of the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated. [7] Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN 0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. [1] Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit. Page 932 0223. This plan may be executed in part by a dispatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof. [8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction. 0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and BAHIA. a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports. b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited capacities of the ports. c A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance are not required. e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, through the United States Naval Observer. [9] PART I. TASK: ORGANIZATION. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is prescribed below: a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations. 1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES NORTH EUROPE. 6. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command of the Commanders NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of: (a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES; (b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES. b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations. 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE. 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department. [10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional sub-area, designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Appendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers. Page 933 11403. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in Appendix I, "Section V." (At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the world showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated flowers." This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBIT-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Naval Court of Inquiry.) [12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III." [13] PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR 2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV." [14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK 2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of Appendix I 2202. The Navy General Task is as follows: a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, will: 1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180 , and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA; 2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN; 3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA; 4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and 5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS. [15] PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially be organized into task forces as follows: a. OCEAN ESCORT; b. STRIKING FORCE; c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE; d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE; e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO; f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE; g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA; i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA: Page 934 Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET-Continued a. TASK PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1); b. TASK DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY [16] c. TASK PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; d. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C"; e. TASK COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES; f. TASK PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS. 3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC. b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direction of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable. 3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. [17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 1. TASK PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA this force will execute the following task: 1. TASK RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC. d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for administrative purposes. 3115. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. Page 935 b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 1. TASK PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. [18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV. Section 1. 3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Transportation Service. b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service. 1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supplemented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States sources. 3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and temporary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of available British facilities. 4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States sources. [19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available. d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1. 3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the preparation of the following plans: 1. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan O-3, RAINBOW No. 5); 2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5. (Navy Plan O- 3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b)); 3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan O-3- B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA; Page 936 4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared. b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. [21] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143. b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones Sectors, and Sub-sectors, are defined in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935, as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. 3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are: a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR. 3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: a. TASK DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW: CATEGORY B-THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. -THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. CATEGORY D-THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. -THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. [22] b. TASK PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3; c. TASK SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC. FLEET; d. TASK SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIER. e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task: 1. TASK SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 3124. a. The following plans will be prepared: 1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this plan; 2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER: (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans-RAINBOW No. 6, including an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval Coastal Frontier Plans O-4, RAINBOW No. 5); 3. By Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICTS: [23] (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans-RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans O-5, RAINBOW No. 5) (b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48; 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. Page 937 2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval Districts. 4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. (b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operation Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment if he so requests. 5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. [25] Section S. COMMAND RELATIONS 3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply: a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are assigned a dual status as follows: 1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations 2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof. b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. [26] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE BERMUDA, by this plan is assigned as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and task purposes. 3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations. 3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Page 938 Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved. [27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows: a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM. 3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA: a. TASK SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS; b. TASK PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK; c. TASK DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY; d. TASK SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155 EAST; [28] e. TASK DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY "D"; f. TASK DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY "F"; g. TASK PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1); h. TASK PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; i. TASK COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES; j. TASK ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE; k. TASK ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES. [29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT in Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, when so directed by that officer. c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired Page 939 by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA. 3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supplemented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service. b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service ill be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU. c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may, at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders of other Naval Coastal Frontiers. [30] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared: 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN-RAINBOW No. 6 (Navy Plan O- 1, RAINBOW No. 5); 2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M; 3. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN- RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval Station Samoa Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5) 4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct. b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plan- RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be prepared. NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 5. [31] Section B. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE. 3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between he west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95 West. 3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks: a. TASK DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY; b. TASK PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES; c. TASK SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR; d. TASK PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. Page 940 [32] 3224. a. The Commander SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service. b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available 3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require the preparation of the following plans: 1. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5); 2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct. b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. [33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143. b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Sub-sectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. 3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are: a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: a. TASK DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW: CATEGORY B-THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER -THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR CATEGORY C-THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER EXCEPT UNALASKA. CATEGORY D-UNALASKA.-THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; [34] b. TASK PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3; c. TASK SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; d. TASK SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIERS. 3234. a. The following plans will be prepared: 1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48; 2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER: (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan-RAINBOW No. 5, including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan O-4, RAINBOW No, 5) 3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS: (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans-RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans O-5, RAINBOW No. 5); (b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48; Page 941 [35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests. 4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. [36] Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS 3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242): a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows: 1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof. b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations. 1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. [37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances. 3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if this situation arises. 3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in Page 942 matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations. 3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved. [38] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.: "Far East Area "Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States. British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows: "(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area. "(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate. "(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES." 3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICTS, who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II). b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order No. 143. [39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks: a. TASK RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY AXIS FORCES; b. TASK SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES.); Page 943 c. TASK DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY; d. TASK PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES; [40] e. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER- CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E" f. TASK ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA. 3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion. 3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States, from commercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS. c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources in the United States d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that Area. [some portion of text not printed in PHA, LWJ] through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed if available. 3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared: 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0- 2, RAINBOW No. 5) 2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix I, Paragraph 48 3. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN- RAINBOW No. 5. (Sixteenth Naval District Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct. b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. Page 944 [42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in London. b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows: 1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; 2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks: a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE 1. TASK ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN APPROACHES; b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE 1. TASK RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES. [43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service or from vessels assigned to the task forces. a. Fuel from United States and British sources. b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from United States sources. c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facilities assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities. d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources. e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available. 3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations. Page 945 [44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix II) is assigned the following task: a. TASK PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE. 1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require. 2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. (a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent-10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent- 16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports. (b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on 10M. NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on 10M. (1) These two forces will move in one convoy. (c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. (d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 15M. (e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M. (f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. (g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. (h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M- day. (i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops of which 15,000 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day. 3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 57. 3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3. [46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan-Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans-Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts. [47] Section B. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE 3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following tasks: a. TASK INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN; Page 946 b. TASK IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVISION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL. 3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following: a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department; b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of commanders of forces afloat, including aircraft. 3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Communication Service Operating Plan-Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans- Rainbow No. 5 which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts. [48] Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. 3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following tasks: a. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH INFORMATION PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN-RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT; b. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY. 3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following: a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence; b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and Outlying Naval Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities. 3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan-Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans- Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts. [49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV, [50] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES 3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to which assigned. Page 947 b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned. c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned. 3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require. 3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establishments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set Forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organizations as indicated in Appendix II of this plan. [51] Section 2. MOBILIZATION 3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps viz.: 1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2; 2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan. b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task. c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV. 3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. 3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be taken over from private sources or other government departments. [52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. 3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. [53] Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING 3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I. "Section V" a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. "21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom. "22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter Page 948 within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations." b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, except protection. Definitions 3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy, the timing at meeting points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys the scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a part of routing. b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District. c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval Coastal Frontier. d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, or through the waters of another Naval Coastal Frontier. e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone. f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. Instructions for routing shipping 3733. INTRA-DISTRICT, INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by them. [66] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping. c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier. 3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING. a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping: 1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States; 2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United Kingdom. b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. 1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south. 2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Districts in which are the ports of assembly of the convoys, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN- Page 949 TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders of vessels. c. PACIFIC AREA. 1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, with the following exceptions: (a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES; (b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA; (c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer. Instructions for the protection of shipping 3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the Operating Forces. [57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combination of these methods. c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping. d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be viewed as having an especial importance. [58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE 3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare". 3742. Except under extraordinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly notified. 3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy. 3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategical Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be detrimental to our own forces. [59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom- Page 950 mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief concerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed. [60] Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD 3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating matters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.) [61] PART IV. LOGISTICS CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks: a. TASK PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES; b. TASK PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES; c. TASK PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA. 4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV. [62] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES Section 1. PERSONNEL 4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for: a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services; b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases; d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54. "The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940". 4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel for such period of time as found to be necessary. [63] Section 2. MATERIAL 4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for: a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material Page 951 will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58). 4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means. 4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). [64] Section 3. TRANSPORTATION 4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by: 1. THE OPERATING FORCES; 2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable. 4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading. b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transportation may be provided. c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations. 4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the District Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57). b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regarding the safety of vessels. c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered vessels), the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army personnel. [65] 4234. The Commander in Chief U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service. [66] Section 4. LEGAL SERVICES 4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, necessary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment. 4242. These services will include: a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Establishment; b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan; c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan- RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraph 59). [67] Section 6. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks. 4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both government and private requirements. Page 952 [68] Section 6. PRIORITIES 4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERVICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the priorities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance. a. PRIORITY ONE 1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial movements to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII 2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. 3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. b. PRIORITY TWO 1. Initial movements to ICELAND. 2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE not specified under PRIORITY ONE. c. PRIORITY THREE 1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under PRIORITIES ONE and TWO. d. PRIORITY FOUR 1. New Construction. [69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES Section 1. PREPARATION FOR WAR SERVICE 4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing personnel to perform their war tasks. 4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION prescribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. 4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the current Operating Force Plan. a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for immediate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. 4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in the current Operating Force Plan. a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobilization Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for mobilization. b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service. [70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far in advance as practicable c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established and other related instructions. Page 953 d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with Navy personnel before being considered ready for war service. e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers direct otherwise, in which case placing them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits. f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except as follows: 1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage; 2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required; [71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled; 4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required; 5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for the installation of batteries and magazines. g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits. h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. 4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels. b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable number of officers and men as follows: 1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET ...................... 6; [72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET ....................... 8; 3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE ................... 8; 4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET ....................... 6 [73] Section 2. MAINTENANCE 4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the Services in condition of readiness for war by: a. Replacement of personnel and material b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities; c. Hospitalization of personnel; d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and welfare of personnel. Replacements 4322 a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in paragraph 1102 of this plan. Page 954 b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services, as determined by war experience. c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation to destination. d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until deficiencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates. e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replacements of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Establishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transportation Service will submit their requests for replacements. f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery. g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows: 1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers designated by them: 2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Commandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based; 3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where delivery is desired; 4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these units are established. h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replacements obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements made to Shore Establishment activities. [75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the Services will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested. Repairs 4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment activities. b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following: 1. The geographic disposition of the various forces; 2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work required; 3. The degree of urgency of the work required; 4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities; 5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers. 4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates. Hospitalization and evacuation 4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units. [76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore Establishment activities. 4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other available vessels having adequate medical facilities. 4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel. Page 955 b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army hospitals or field medical units. Recreation and welfare 4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps personnel. b. Provisions for these activities will include: 1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Establishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are concentrated, and at Training Stations; 2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel. [77] Section 3. AUGMENTATION 4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the Services by: a. New construction of vessels and aircraft b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service; c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy from other Government Departments; d. Acquisition of material. 4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission. [78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES 4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with instructions issued in separate directives. [79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE 4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render salvage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas prescribed in paragraph 4101.c. b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.c. 4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within the waters of the United States. 4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels: 1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY PIONEER GUIDE DISCOVER; 2. From the COAST GUARD REDWING. b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and two on the Pacific Coast of the United States. [80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BV THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in Part V, WPL-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128. 4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies. Page 956 [81] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE 5101. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60: "The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means." 5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. [82] CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES 5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61: "Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government. "The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects: a. Intelligence Service; b. Censorship and Publicity; c. Mobilization of Resources." 5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Intelligence Service. b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censorship and Publicity. c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources. [1] APPENDIX I. To WPL-46, THE JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN- RAINBOW No. 5 [2] SECTION I. DIRECTIVE 1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 5, contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in paragraph 2 of this paper. 2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) now in process of drafting. [3] SECTION II. DEFINITIONS 3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power. 4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as including all such Powers. 5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia, 6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force. Page 957 [4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either: a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22. 9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account. 10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region. 11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense. [5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR 12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941. "10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies. " 11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are: (a) United States The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power (b) British Commonwealth The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort (c) Sea Communications The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort. [6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers: (a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures. (b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power. (c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis. (d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength. (e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers. (f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany. (g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive. "13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following: Page 958 [7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. (b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance. (c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa. (d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. [8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres. (f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere, and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack. (g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces. (h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplishment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air operations against the sources of Axis military power. (i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source. (j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war." 13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will be governed by the following: (a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces. (b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort. Page 959 [10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS 14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to war operations. In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and ABC-22). 15. Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power. b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances. c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks. d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade. e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups. f. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth in paragraph 16. [11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces. a. United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas: (1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25 South and west of Longitude 30 West, except: (a) The area between Latitude 20 North and Latitude 43 North which lies east of Longitude 40 West. (b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. (2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows: (a) North of Latitude 30 North and west of Longitude 140 East; (b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140 East; (c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180 to the South American coast and Longitude 74 West; except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155 East. (12] b. The Far East Area. Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows: (1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area. (2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate. (3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in- Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines. Page 960 (4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30 North, east to Longitude 140 East thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141 East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11 South, Longitude 120 East, thence south to Latitude 13 South, thence west to Longitude 92 East, thence north to Latitude 20 North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma. [13] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established. d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as initially delimited are: (1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180 and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area. (2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30 West and to the Northward of Latitude 43 North and the land areas bordering on, and the islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry. (3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. (a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43 North, (b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20 North, [14] (c) Western boundary, Longitude 40 West (d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5 West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto. (e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows: To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean. To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic. (f) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in- Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet. (4) The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA comprises: (a) The area between Latitudes 20 North and 25 South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30 West and on the east by the African Coast. (b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25 South between Longitudes 74 West and 33 East, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto. (5) The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5 West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area. [15] (6) The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA comprises: (a) India (b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33 East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station. (c) The islands in the above ocean area. 17. Collaboration in Planning. a. The High Commands of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will Page 961 similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided. b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to insure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these Missions will be as follows: (1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction. (2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction. c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited. d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces. e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary. f. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations. [17] Communications 18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows: a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military Mission in London. b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom. 19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations. Control and Protection of Shipping 20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. 21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom. 22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment Page 962 of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations. 23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agreements are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will be incorporated in this plan. [19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS 24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by: a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive; b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive; c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers; d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack. [20] SECTION VII. TASKS 25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III. 26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations. The Western Atlantic Area 27. Definition. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas north of latitude 25 South, and west of Longitude 30 West except the area between Latitudes 20 North and 43 North which lies east of Longitude 40 West. 28. Army Tasks. a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere. b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases. d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba. e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana. [21] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany. h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if such garrisons have been established. 29. Army Forces. a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detachments. b. Local defense forces. Page 963 c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and Latin American Republics. Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 30. Navy Tasks. a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. [22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones. f. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. 31. Navy Forces. a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments. b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Pacific Area. 32. Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows: a. North of Latitude 30 North and west of Longitude 140 East. b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140 East. c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180 to South American coast and Longitude 74 West. 33. Army Tasks. a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in that Hemisphere. b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. [23] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases. d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 34. Army Forces. a. Local defense forces. b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the West Coast of South America. Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 35. Navy Tasks. a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area. d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155 East. e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere. f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area. g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam. h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area. 36. Navy Forces. a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments. b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. Page 964 The Far East Area 37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier-Category of Defense "E". 38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally. 39. Navy Tasks. a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces. b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues.) [25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier- Category of Defense "E". 40. Navy Forces. a. The Asiatic Fleet. United Kingdom and British Home Waters 41. Definition. a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30 West and to the Northward of Latitude 43 North. b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area. 42. Army Tasks. a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation. b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon. c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles. [26] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in cooperation with the Navy defend that island-Category of Defense "D". 43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces: a. British Isles. 3 Heavy Bombardment Groups 2 Medium Bombardment Groups 3 Pursuit Groups Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases) One reinforced Regiment (Token Force) b. Iceland. One reinforced Division. Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51. 44. Navy Tasks and Forces. a. Northwest Escort Force. Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches. b. Submarine Force Three. Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines. North Atlantic Area. [27] 45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows: a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43 North. b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20 North. c. Western boundary, Longitude 40 West. d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5 West 46. Navy Tasks and Forces. a. Submarine Force Two. Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic. Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision. Page 965 b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean. [28] 47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions. Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier except United States Bases in Newfoundland Category B United States Bases in Newfoundland Category C Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier Category B Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers Category D Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except Alaska Category B Alaska, Less Unalaska Category C Unalaska Category D Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D Philippine Coastal Frontier Category E Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine Coastal Frontier. Bermuda Category C Iceland Category D Midway, Johnston, Palmyra Category D Guam Category F 48. Joint Plans to be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will be disregarded. a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as required by ABC-22. c. Joint Sub-sector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports are located. [29] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS 49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required. 50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transport Service. 51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless M-day has occurred before such date. a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop movements specified in this subparagraph a. (1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent-10,500 troops embark on 24-M. Second contingent-16,000 troops embark on 57-M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports. (2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M. (3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M. These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy (4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. Page 966 [30] (5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to destination. (6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. (7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported. These two forces sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy. (8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. (9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported. (10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be transported. (11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 15-M. (12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M. (13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20- M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. (14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. [31] (15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day. (16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day. b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day. (1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000 troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco. (2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The 56 aircraft may be flown to destination. (3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINATIONS, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum rate of movement 60,000 troops per month. (4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M. SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES [32] 52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of additional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect. 53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day. 54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional ports of embarkation at: New Orleans, La. Galveston, Texas Boston, Mass. Charleston, S. C 56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject Page 967 to the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from production sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other with the material involved. 57. Supply Levels. Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this paragraph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved. a. Supplies other than ammunition. (1) Iceland 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. (2) British Isles Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months. Pursuit Aircraft 60 days, build up to 120 days within six months. (3) Panama and Caribbean 30 days, build up to 45 days within six Coastal Frontiers. months. (4) Newfoundland and Alaska 30 Days build up to 60 Days within six (Less Unalaska). months. (5) Unalaska 60 days, build up to 90 days within six months. (6) Bermuda Maintain at 30 days. (7) Hawaii Maintain at 70 days. [34] (8) Philippines As the situation may permit, the desirable standard being the maintenance of stocks at 90 days' supply. b. Ammunition for places listed under 57 a: (1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then maintain at that level. (2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then maintain five times the mobilization allowance. (3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days within six months. (4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' operations; build up to 120 days within six months. 58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with the following general policy: a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial needs. b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as necessary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with national policy. [35] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy and the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole. 59. Supporting Legislative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan. 60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained Page 968 through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships and all related means. 61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects: a. Intelligence Service b. Censorship and Publicity. c. Mobilization of Resources. SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES [36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemisphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases. 63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the Island of Ferando do Noronha. 64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa. 65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage opposition to the Axis Powers. 66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government. [37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. 1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein. 2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read: "33. Joint organization and command. "a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and sub-sectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below. NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I of reference (a). "b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries, where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.) "c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier. [38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada. Page 969 "e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b." 3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows: "34. North Atlantic coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. Northern.-Northern boundary of the United States, but including United States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22. Southern.-Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River, Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. "b. Commanders. Army.-The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an officer, designated by him. Navy.-The Commandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. [39] "c. Sectors.-The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors: (1) Newfoundland sector. (a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22. The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command. Navy.-Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland. (2) New England sector. (a) Boundaries. Northern.-Northern boundary of the United States. Southern.-Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command. Navy.-The Commandant, First Naval District. (c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport sub-sectors, with boundaries as follows: [40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston sub-sectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts. 2. Between the Boston and the Newport sub-sectors: Pollock Rip Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston sub-sector. (3) New York sector. (a) Boundaries. Northern.-Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. Southern.-Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command. Navy.-Commandant, Third Naval District. (c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey sub-sectors with boundary as follows: Between sub-sectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island sub-sector. Page 970 (4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector. (a) Boundaries. Northern.-Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton exclusive. [41] Southern.-Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.) Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake sub-sectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware sub-sector), southern and western boundary of Delaware. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command. Navy.-There is no naval commander of this sector. The Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Delaware sub-sector, and the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Chesapeake sub-sector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval District, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts." 4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows: "35. Southern coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. Northern.-Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive. [42] Southern.-The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends southeastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that boundary. "b. Commanders. Army.-The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an officer designated by him. Navy.-The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. "c. Sectors.-This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively." 5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: "35A. Caribbean coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded as follows: [43] Beginning at latitude 18 05' North, longitude 87 32' West thence by a line bearing 63 true to the 25th parallel of latitude thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence by a line direct to latitude 2 North, longitude 49 West, thence by a line direct to the place of beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary. "b. Commanders Army.-The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him. Navy.-The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. Page 971 "c. Sectors-The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors: (1) Guantanamo sector. (a) Boundaries.-The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, Hispaniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal frontier boundaries. (b) Commanders Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. [44] Navy.-Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. (2) Puerto Rico sector. (a) Boundaries.-The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. (b) Commanders Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. Navy.-The Commandant, Tenth Naval District. (3) Trinidad sector. (a) Boundaries.-The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. Navy.-The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad." 6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: "35B. Panama coastal frontier. [45] "a. Boundaries. All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador, all land areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5 South, longitude 95 West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries. "b. Commanders. Army.-The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him. Navy.-The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. "c. Sectors The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors: (1) Atlantic sector. (a) Boundaries.-The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continental divide. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. Navy.-The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District. (2) Pacific sector. (a) Boundaries.-The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries. (b) Commanders. Army.-As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command. Navy.-The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District." Page 972 7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: "35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama coastal frontier." 8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read: "36. Pacific coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. Northern.-Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required by ABC-22. [47] Southern.-Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico. (1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.-The Pacific coastal frontier is divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern boundary of California. "b. Commanders. Army.-The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an officer designated by him. Navy.-(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also designated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier. (2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. (3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands the naval local defense force assigned to his district. (4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. [48] "c. Sectors.-This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows: (1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California sectors, Santa Maria River. (2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of California. (3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of Washington. (4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector. "d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into sub-sectors with boundaries as follows: (1) San Diego sub-sector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive. (2) San Pedro sub-sector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive. (3) Monterey sub-sectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive. (4) San Francisco sub-sector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California. (5) Columbia River sub-sector: Northern boundary of California to Moclips, Wash., inclusive. (6) Seattle sub-sector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington. [49] (7) Sitka naval sub-sector: Alaska east of longitude 141 West. (8) Kodiak naval sub-sector: Alaska west of longitude 141 West. 9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: "36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. Page 973 "b. Commanders Army.-The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Navy.-The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army. "36B. Philippine coastal frontier. "a. Boundaries. The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of the sea approaches to the coastal frontier. [60] "b. Commanders. Army.-The Commanding General, Philippine Department. Navy.-The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. (At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the United States showing; the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex I. Coastal Frontiers". This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 2, EXHIBITS- ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.) [1] APPENDIX II TO WPL-46, COMPOSITION OF FORCES [2] CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service. 2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number. b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name. c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning purposes, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the system defined in WPL 10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.). 2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names. b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature (AP 60, AS 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships. 2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. 2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and aircraft belong, as follows: A-Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day; B-Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under construction; C-Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government to be commissioned in the Navy; [3] D-Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis; E-Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis; CG-Coast Guard vessels. CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET as of July 1 1941. 2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, submarine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE Page 974 TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE BASE, COCO SOLO. b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation. 2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations the Commander in Chief U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein: 1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE. 18 VPB and necessary Tenders; 2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary Tenders; 3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary Tenders. b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub- paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief. [5] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations for the transportation of Army troops. 2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and submarines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances. TABLE ATF-1 Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes BATTLESHIPS Batdiv 3 BB 3 Batdiv 5 BB 3 CRUISERS CA 31 CA 1 Crudiv 7 CA 4 Crudiv 8 CL 4 Crudiv 2 CL 4 DESTROYERS AD 2, 12 AD 2 DD 141, 187, 343 ODD 3 Desdiv 54 ODD 4 Desdiv 22 DD 4 Desron 2 DD 9 Desron 8 DD 9 Desron 9 DD 8 1,850 tons Desron 13 DD 8 AIRCRAFT Cardiv 3 CV 2 CV 5 CV 1 Patwing 3 VP-31 VPB 12 VP-32 VPB 12 AVD 4, 9 AVD 2 AVP 1, 9 AVP 2 Patwing 5 VP-51 VPB 12 VP-52 VPB 12 AVD 13 AVD 1 AVP 3, 8 AVP 2 SUBMARINES PG 53 PG 1 Subron 1 S/M Base, New London ASR 2 ASR 1 Subdiv 11 OSS 8 Subdiv 12 OSS 7 Exdiv 1 AG 24 AG 1 SS 20, 48 OSS 2 SS 204 SS 1 Page 975 TABLE ATF-1-Continued Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes SUBMARINE-Continued. Subron 3 S/M Base, Coco Solo ASR 4 ASR 1 Subdiv 31 OSS 6 Subdiv 32 OSS 6 Subron 7 AS 5, 21 AS 2 Subdiv 71 OSS 3 Subdiv 72 OSS 7 Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2 S/M Base, St. Thomas TRAIN VESSELS AF 1, 9 AF 2 AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941. AG 17 AG 1 AKS 3 AKS 1 AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941. AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, AO 8 19, 26 AT 37, 66 AT 2 AE 2 AE 1 To be assigned in August, 1941. MINECRAFT Minron 7 Mindiv 13 DMS 4 Mindiv 14 AM 7 TRANSPORTS Transdiv 1 AP 4 Transdiv 11 APD 2 PATROL CRAFT Subchaserdiv 31 PC 5 DUANE (CG) XPG 1 INGHAM (CG) XPG 1 CAMPBELL (CG) XPG 1 SPENCER (CG) XPG 1 HAMILTON (CG) XPG 1 BIBB (CG) XPG 1 NORTH STAR (CC,) XPG 1 NORTHLAND (CG) XPG 1 AG 29 AG 1 UNCLASSIFIED IX 20 IX 1 NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1 MARINE CORPS FORCES First Marine Division First Marine Aircraft Group Fifth Defense Battalion [6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 2 301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941. b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 2-302. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, patrol planes and submarines, and Tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein: 1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary Tenders, 2 SS and necessary Tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR); 2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary Tenders. b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief. 2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances. Page 976 TABLE PAF-1 Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes BATTLESHIPS Batdiv 1 BB 3 Batdiv 2 BB 3 Batdiv 4 BB 3 CRUISERS Crudiv 4 CA 4 Crudiv 6 CA 4 Crudiv 9 CL 5 DESTROYERS Desflot 1 CL 7 CL 1 AD 3,4 AD 2 Desron 1 (less one Desdiv) DD 5 Desron 3, 5 DD 18 Desflot 2 CL 8 CL 1 AD 11, 14 AD 2 Desron 4, 6 DD 18 Desdiv 50 ODD 4 MINECRAFT CM 4 CM 1 Mindiv 1, 2 DM 8 AIRCRAFT Cardiv 1 CV 2 Cardiv 2 (less CV 5) CV 1 Patwing 1 VP-11 VPB 12 VP-12 VPB 6 VP-13 VPB 5 VP-14 VPB 12 AV 1 AV 1 AVD 6, 10 AVD 2 AVP 4 AVP 1 Patwing 2 VP-21 VPB 12 VP-22 VPB 12 VP-23 VPB 12 VP-24 VPB 12 AV 4 AV 1 AVD 11, 14 AVD 2 AVP 7 AVP 1 Patwing 4 VP-41 VPB 6 VP-42 VPB 6 VP-43 VPB 6 To be formed about October 1, 1941. VP-44 VPB 6 AVD 2, 12 AVD 2 AVP 5, 6 AVP 2 SUBMARINES CL 9 CL 1 Subron 2 AS 3 AS 1 ASR 5 ASR 1 Subdiv 21 SS 6 Subdiv 22 SS 6 Subron 4 S/M Base, Pearl Harbor DD 336 ODD 1 AM 30 AM 1 ASR 1 ASR 1 Subdiv 41 OSS 6 Subdiv 42 SS 4 Includes SM 1. Subdiv 43 SS 5 Subron 6 Subdiv 61 SS 3 Subdiv 62 SS 3 BASE FORCE TRAIN VESSELS AE 1 AE 1 To be assigned in August, 1941. AF 7, 8, 11 AF 3 AG 16, 31 AG 2 AH 1 AH 1 AKS 1, 2 AKS 2 AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52 AM 10 AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 AO 14 AR 1, 4 AR 2 ARb 1 ARb 1 EXAD 13. ARD 1 ARD 1 AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65 AT 6 TRANSPORTS Transdiv 2 AP 2 Transdiv 4 AP 2 Transdiv 12 APD 4 Page 977 TABLE PAF-1-Continued Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes BASE FORCE-Continued MINE SQUADRON 3 DMS 13 DMS 1 Mindiv 4 DMS 4 Mindiv 5 DMS 4 Mindiv 6 DMS 4 NAVAL STATION, GUAM NAVAL STATION, SAMOA Seventh Defense Battalion MARINE CORPS FORCES Second Marine Division Second Marine Aircraft Group Second Defense Battalion Sixth Defense Battalion TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes CRUISERS Crudiv 5 CA 4 CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE as of July 2, 1941. TABLE SEP-1. Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes CRUISERS Crudiv 3 CL 2 DESTROYERS Desdiv 1 or 2 DD 4 As assigned by CinCpac CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 2-502. One stores ship (AF} and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. TABLE ASF-2. Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes CRUISERS CA 30 CA 1 CL 12 CL 1 DESTROYERS AD 9 AD 1 Desron 29 ODD 13 AIRCRAFT Patwing 10 VP-101 VPB 12 VP-102 VPB 12 AV 3 AV 1 AVD 1, 7 AVD 2 AVP 2 AVP 1 SUBMARINES Subron 20 AS 9, 20 AS 2 ASR 6 ASR 1 Subdiv 201 OSS 6 Subdiv 202 SS 4 Subdiv 203 SS 7 PATROL CRAFT PG 21, 22 PG 2 PR 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 PR 5 PY 10 PY 1 Page 978 TABLE ASF-2.-continued Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes TRAIN AO 6, 13 AO 2 AT 32 AT 1 Mindiv 3 AM 2 Mindiv 9 AM 4 MARINE CORPS FORCES Marine Detachments Fourth Marines (Shanghai) Marine Detachments (North China) Marine Detachments (Philippines) [7] CHAPTER VI. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 2-601 The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE show the initial composition as of July 1, 1941. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE-TABLE NE-1 1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material preparation. b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE - TABLE NE-2. TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes DESTROYERS AD 15 AD 1 Desron 7 DD 9 Desrons 30, 31 ODD 18 DD 341, Desdiv 53 ODD 5 Desdiv 21 DD 4 Mobile Destroyer Repair Units 1, 2 AIRCRAFT Patwing 7 VP-71 VPB 12 VP-72 VPB 12 VP-73 VPB 9 VP-74 VPB 9 AV 5 AV 1 AVD 3, 8 AVD 2 Patwing 8 VP-81 VPB 12 VP-82 VPB 12 VP-83 VPB 12 VP-84 VPB 12 AVD 5 AVD 1 Patwing 9 VP-91 VPB 12 This wing will be VP-92 VPB 12 formed following VP-93 VPB 12 completion of VP-94 VPB 12 Patwing 8. Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, 2 TRAIN VESSELS AM 73, 74, 75, 77 AM 4 AMc 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50 AMc 6 MARINE CORPS FORCES Eleventh Provisional Marine Company TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes SUBMARINES Subron 5 AS 13 AS 1 ASR 3 ASR 1 Subdiv 51 OSS 7 Subdiv 52 OSS 4 Subdiv 53 OSS 6 Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3 Page 979 CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the Chief of Naval Operations. TABLE CNO-1. Unit-Vessel Symbol No. Notes AG 1 AG 1 AG 23 AG 1 SecNav Yacht. AG 25, 26 AG 2 President's Yacht and tender. AG 30, 32 AG 2 Survey vessels. AM 40 AM 1 BuOrd duty. PG 52 PG 1 Tender for PT's and PTC's MTB Squadron 1 PT 6 MTB Squadron 2 PT 7 Subchaser Squadron 1 PTC 4 COMANCHE(CG) XPY 1 Greenland Patrol ALGONQUIN (CG) XPY 1 Greenland Patrol. MODOC (CG) XPG 1 Greenland Patrol. RARITAN (CG) XYT 1 Greenland Patrol. IX 50 IX 1 Greenland Patrol. SS 206 to 211 incl. SS 6 In commission or to be commissioned and to operate either under the CNO or CinClant for temporary duty. To be assigned to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. [8] CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following general rules: a. TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES 1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"). 2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval Local Defense Forces. 3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant. b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT 1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force. c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are operating. [9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard. b. Lighthouse Tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy. Page 980 2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces in tabular form. 1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) ...... Column (1). 2. Subgroup ........................................... Column (2). 3. From (Indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations) ..... Column (3). 4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which the vessel is to be mobilized) ............ Column (4). b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship. 2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in Column (4), where mobilization will take place. [10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration of the following: a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the Mobilization; b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion; c. Equipment available; d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion; e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no conversion. 2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts. TABLE NACF.-NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL COASTAL FORCE Navy Vessels PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56 ..... 5 PE A PY 12, 13, 15, 16 ......... 4 PY A PG 17, 18, 54 ............. 3 PG A VPB ..................... 18 VPB A USAF Administration AV or AVD or AVP number as A USAF in U. S. ATLAN- required TIC FLEET. ZNP ...................... 6 ZNP A IV ND Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, Salem, Mass. Air Station, New York, N. Y. Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C. Vessels from Other Sources XPG 1 .................... 1 XPG D CNO I XPG 2, 3 ................. 2 XPG D CNO III NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XYP 1 to 30 incl. ....... 30 XYP D I ND I XAGs 1, 2 ............... 2 XAGs D I ND I XAM 1 to 4 incl. ........ 4 XAM D I ND I XAMb 1 to 9 incl. ....... 9 XAMb D I ND I XAMc 1, 2 ............... 2 XAMc D I ND I Units Ashore As indicated in I ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, Corps Plan, RAINBOW No. 5. Page 981 TABLE NACF.-NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER-Continued Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT Naval Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XYP 31 .................. 1 XYP D III ND III XAM 5 to 13 incl. ....... 9 XAM D I ND I XAMb 10 to 14 incl. ..... 5 XAMb D I ND I XAMc 3 to 16 incl. ...... 14 XAMc D I ND I Units Ashore As indicated in III ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 1 ................... 1 XCMc D I ND I XPYc 1, 2 ................ 2 XPYc D III ND III XPYc 3, 4 ................ 2 XPYc D IV ND IV XAGs 3 ................... 1 XAGs D IV ND IV XAM 14 to 21 incl. ....... 8 XAM D I ND I XAMb 15 to 24 incl. ..... 10 XAMb D I ND I XAMc 17 to 19 incl. ...... 3 XAMc D IV ND IV XAMc 20 .................. 1 XAMc D I ND I Units Ashore As indicated in IV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2 RAINBOW No. 5 NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 2 ................... 1 XCMc D V ND V XYP 32 to 38 include. .... 7 XYP D V ND V XAGs 4 ................... 1 XAGs D IV ND V XAM 22, 23 ............... 2 XAM D I ND I XAMc 21 to 31 incl. ..... 11 XAMc D V ND V Units Ashore As indicated in V ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. Page 982 TABLE SCF.-SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL COASTAL FORCE Navy Vessels None Coast Guard Vessels MOJAVE, TAMPA ..... 240' 2 XPG CG VI ND VI TALLAPOOSA ........ Misc. 1 XPY CG VI ND VI MOHAWK ............ 165' 1 XPY CG IV ND VI Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, Charleston, S. C. Air Station, Miami, Fla. Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla. Air Station, Biloxi, Miss. Vessels from Other Sources XPG 4 .................... 1 XPG D CNO VI XPY 1 to 4 incl. ......... 4 XPY D III ND III NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 3 ................... 1 XCMc D III ND III XPYc 5, 6 ................ 2 XPYc D III ND III XYP 39 to 44 incl. ....... 6 XYP D VI ND VI XAGs 5, 6 ................ 2 XAGs D VI ND VI XAM 24 to 27 incl. ....... 4 XAM D I ND I XAMb 25 to 31 incl. ...... 7 XAMb D I ND I XAMb 32 to 34 incl. ...... 3 XAMb D VI ND VI Units Ashore As indicated in VI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XPYc 7, 8 ................ 2 XPYc D I ND I XPYc 9, 10 ............... 2 XPYc D III ND III XAGs 7, 8 ................ 2 XAGs D VII ND VII XAM 28, 29 ............... 2 XAM D I ND I XAMb 35, 36 .............. 2 XAMb D I ND I XAMc 32 to 35 incl. ...... 4 XAMc D I ND I Units Ashore As indicated in VII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 4 ................... 1 XCMc D III ND III XPYc 11 to 18 incl. ...... 8 XPYc D IX ND VIII XYP 45 to 50 incl. ....... 6 XYP D VIII ND VIII XYP 51 to 55 incl. ....... 5 XYP D V ND V XAGs 9 to 11 incl. ....... 3 XAGs D VIII ND VIII XAMb 37 to 40 incl. ...... 4 XAMb D VIII ND VIII XAMc 36 to 40 incl. ...... 5 XAMc D I ND I XAMc 41 to 43 incl. ...... 3 XAMc D VI ND VI Page 983 TABLE SCF.- SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER-Continued Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT-Continued Units Ashore As directed in VIII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. TABLE CACF.-CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67 ............ 5 ODD A VPB ..................... 12 VPB A USAF Administration AV or AVP or AVD number as in required. .................... A USAF U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XPG ...................... 2 XPG D CNO X XPC 2, 3, 4 .............. 3 XPC D III ND III XPY 8 .................... 1 XPY D V ND V XPY 9, 10 ................ 2 XPY D III ND III XPYc 24 to 27 incl. ...... 4 XPYc D III ND III XPYc 28 to 31 incl. ...... 4 XPYc D I ND I XYP 128 to 131 incl. ..... 4 XYP D IV ND IV XAM 42 to 47 incl. ....... 6 XAM D I ND I XAMb 61 to 66 incl. ...... 6 XAMb D V ND V XAMb 67 to 70 incl. ...... 4 XAMb D I ND I XAMc 93 to 102 incl. .... 10 XAMc D I ND I Units Ashore As indicated in X ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. TABLE PACF.-PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802 Appendix II. ODD Desdiv 67 4 ODD A PG 50 1 PG A VPB 12 VPB A USAF Administration AV or AVP or AVD number in as required. ................... A USAF U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Coast Guard Vessels: Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources. XCMc 6 ................... 1 XCMc D V ND V XPC 5, 6 ................. 2 XPC D III ND III XPY 11 to 14 incl. ....... 4 XPY D IX ND VIII XPYc 32 to 43 incl. ..... 12 XPYc D III ND III XPYc 44 to 46 incl. ...... 3 XPYc D V ND V XPYc 47 .................. 1 XPYc D VI ND VI XYP 132 to 141 .......... 10 XYP D IV ND IV XAGs 16, 17 .............. 2 XAGs D VIII ND VIII XAM 48 to 50 incl. ....... 3 XAM D I ND I XAMb 71, 72 .............. 2 XAMb D V ND V XAMc 103 to 116 incl. ... 14 XAMc D V ND V Units Ashore As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5 Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5 Page 984 TABLE PSCF.-PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL COASTAL FORCE Navy Vessels ODD Desdiv 70, 83 ........ 8 ODD A PE 32, 38 ................ 2 PE A PY 14 .................... 1 PY A VPB ..................... 12 VPB A USAF Administration AV or AVD or AVP number in as required ................... A USAF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Coast Guard Vessels TANEY ............... 327' 1 XPY CG IXV ND SHAWNEE ............ Misc. 1 XPY CG XII ND XII Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, San Francisco, Calif. Air Station, San Diego, Calif. Vessels from Other Sources XPG 5 .................... 1 XPG D CNO XII XPY 5, 6, 7 .............. 3 XPG D XI ND XI NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-ELEV- ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT: Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific South- ern Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels: Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-403, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 5 .................. 1 XCMc D III ND III XPC 1 ................... 1 XPC D XI ND XI XYP 93 to 97 incl. ...... 5 XYP D XI ND XI XAGs 14 ................. 1 XAGs D XI ND XI XAM 39 TO 41 incl. ...... 3 XAM D XI ND XI XAMb 51 to 60 incl. .... 10 XAMb D XI ND XI XAMc 65 to 86 incl. .... 22 XAMc D XI ND XI Units Ashore: As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces: Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. Vessels from Other Sources XYP 98 to 127 incl. .... 30 XYP D XII ND XII XAGs 15 ................ 1 XAGs D XII ND XII XAM 87 to 92 incl. ..... 6 XAMc D XII ND XII Units Ashore As indicated in XII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. TABLE PNCF.-PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-THIR- TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. ODD Desdiv 82 ........... 5 ODD A PG 51 ................... 1 PG A PE 57 ................... 1 PE A SS ...................... 2 SS A USPF Administration ASR ..................... 1 ASR A USPF in VPB .................... 12 VPB A USPF U. S. AV or AVD or AVP number PACIFIC as required. ................... A USPF FLEET Page 985 TABLE NACF.-NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER-Continued Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. AURORA ........... 165' B 1 XPC CG XI ND XIII Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash. Vessels from Other Sources XPYc 19 to 23 incl. ..... 5 XPYc D XI ND XIII XYP 56 to 92 incl. ..... 37 XYP D XIII ND XIII XAGs 12, 13 ............. 2 XAGs D XIII ND XIII XAM 30 to 38 incl. ...... 9 XAM D XI ND XIII XAMb 41 to 50 incl. .... 10 XAMb D XIII ND XIII XAMc 44 to 64 incl. .... 21 XAMc D XIII ND XIII XAOb 1, 2 ............... 2 XAOb D CNO XIII Units Ashore As indicated in XIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. TABLE UCF.-HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER Unit-Vessel Sub- From Mob. Notes group Dist. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE Navy Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. ODD Desdiv 80 ........... 4 ODD A PG 19 ................... 1 PG A Coast Guard Vessels Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. DAPHNE ........... 165' B 1 XPC CG XII ND XII Vessels from Other Sources XCMc 7 .................. 1 XCMc D V ND V XYP 142 to 167 incl. ... 26 XYP D XIV ND XIV XAM 51 to 55 incl. ...... 5 XAM D I ND I XAM 56 .................. 1 XAM D XII ND XII XAMc 117 to 119 incl. ... 3 XAMc D XIV ND XIV XAOb 3, 4 ............... 2 XAOb D CNO XIV XYF 1 to 5 incl. ........ 5 XYF D XIV ND XIV Units Ashore As indicated in XIV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. First Defense Battalion Third Defense Battalion TABLE PHCF.-PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIX TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT Such suitable vessels as are locally available and additional vessels and air raft as assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. Unit shore As indicated in XVI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5. Marine Corps Forces Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. [11] CHAPTER XI. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.

    Circa 1940

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: VP-11 "...San Clemente Island: The inscription carved into the concrete interior reads: V.C. Harlidge VP Eleven, US Navy, San Diego, July 12, 1940..." Contributed by Bill Sturgeon WJSLJS@aol.com [26JAN2001]

    HistoryA BIT OF HISTORY: "...Circa 1940 AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE - Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol - HULBERT (AVD-6) - LCDR J. V. Carney..." Contributed by John Lucas john.lucas@netzero.net [15DEC98]

    PATROL WING ONE - CDR W. K. Harrill

    TENDERS

    USS HULBERT (AVD-6) - LCDR J. V. Carney
    USS PELICAN (AVP-6) - LT H. J. Dyson
    USS AVOCET (AVP-4) - LT R. E. Dixon

    SQUADRONS

    VP-11 - LCDR J. W. Harris
    VP-12 - LCDR C. W. Oexle
    VP-13 - LCDR S. B. Cooke
    VP-14 - LCDR W. T. Rassieur

    PATROL WING TWO - CAPTAIN Patrick N. L. Bellinger

    TENDERS

    USS WRIGHT (AV-1) - CDR J. M. Shoemaker,
    USS WILLIAM B. PRESTON (AVD-7) - LCDR F. J. Bridget
    USS SWAN (AVP-7) - and LT A. R. Truslow, Jr.

    SQUADRONS

    VP-22 - LCDR W. P. Cogswell
    VP-23 - LCDR G. Van Deurs
    VP-24 - LCDR D. C. Allen
    VP-25 - LCDR A. R. Brady
    VP-26 - LCDR A. N. Perkins


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